

judgment alone, John Stuart Mill asks the question, "In what consists the principal and most characteristic difference between one human intellect and another?" and answers, "In their ability to judge correctly of evidence." Now, does the education of our schools perceptibly increase the power of practical judgment? And then, the imagination! Do not the Philistines much more abound? To describe briefly the actual character of the training afforded by classics in these respects, and to make a few suggestions as to practice, have been the main objects of this paper. At the same time, it attempts to define the true position of classics in a liberal education.

From an educational point of view all knowledge is sometimes divided into science and philology—philology being used in its broader and truer application. Another, and equally good division is into real knowledge, and knowledge instrumental as training. We claim for classical study that it gives a very serious answer to the question: "What knowledge is of most worth?" and that it gives unequalled training of its kind. Looking again to the first division of knowledge, we might vindicate the first place in a liberal education for philology, and in philology the first place for classics, or the "humanities." But here this would be as idle an inquiry as whether the eyes or the ears were the nobler when both are necessary.

If we admit, as indeed it may be demonstrated that during the early years of training, language is the most important instrument, the old question is at once put, Why not Moderns? And another question, still more urgently, Why not English? These, we are told, would save both time and labour, and it is an eminently practical matter. For the majority it must be frankly admitted, that from the

necessities of the case, the basis of education should be English—not classical and not mathematical. This means of course a serious, though necessary, loss in the pupil's development. But, confining ourselves to a liberal education, if we can show that English will not serve as the best basis for the study of language, we practically show the same for Moderns. The strongest arguments are these: that for the study of language as language, the highest type of language is necessary, and this we have in Latin and Greek; that even if English be a greater language (as we are sometimes informed), nevertheless, new power can be added to it by the comparative study of an inflected language, while, at the same time, these very languages are a most intimate part of our own; thirdly that our own language is too near to us, too much a part of ourselves, to make it possible for any but minds already well trained to study it as language *per se*—the difficulty being similar to that of studying contemporary history or the human mind. This much for English as mental language training. It may be proved, and I hope to suggest some strong reasons for it, that the one solid foundation for a liberal knowledge of our own language and literature is the Greek and Latin classics. And the very same arguments apply to French and German. The classics are the true foundation of a liberal education in either of these languages and literatures. There remains, however, the argument from practical utility, that French and German are becoming more and more necessary for the higher study of medicine, engineering, and other scientific pursuits. I should reply, that in this case the question ceases to be one of mental training, that regard should be had for the needs of this class of pupils, but that their number is not greater than those