

aggressor. All these factors are just as much part of the deterrent as the thermo-nuclear retaliatory forces themselves.

To maintain the deterrent power of the free nations will not be an easy task, essential though it is to our survival. Paradoxically, as the existence of the deterrent continues to protect the peace, the continuance of that peace itself may tend to soften up the very deterrent force on which it depends, for it tends to give credibility to smiling assurances and friendly, folksy visits, all propagating the view that the day of world brotherhood has dawned at last, and suggesting that we can now safely set aside our defence programmes, with their heavy costs, and concentrate on the much more pleasant task of raising our material standard of life.

To thus relax our defence effort might be an inviting policy for the free nations, but it would be a very dangerous policy. We would be foolish indeed to neglect those defensive measures that have created the deterrent that has so far kept us all safe from a major war. Rather, we should, I think, make sure that those defensive measures are kept bright and strong.

Our opponents have a very keen understanding and appreciation of the importance of strength. This we have reason to know. They also have perhaps a better understanding than we of the subtle, insinuating effects of persuasive propaganda. If we must sup with the Kremlin, we should always be careful to use a very long spoon.

Change in Defence System

Today I should like briefly to touch on a few of the more notable ways in which Canada is building and maintaining a defence effort that is really out of all proportion to our status as a middle power. Hon. members have in their hands the white paper in which Canada's defence programme is spelled out in greater detail than I could hope to do in the time at my disposal today. My main purpose today, therefore, is to supplement what is in the white paper by drawing attention to some of the highlights, and by telling hon. members something of the changes taking place in our own defence system. In the discussions to follow, hon. members' questions will, I hope, enable me to give a more complete picture of that programme, and their suggestions will as always, I can assure them, receive not only my own consideration but that of my service advisers.

Change has been operative in many fields of defence activity in Canada, but particularly so in our air defence arrangements. Arising from continuing reassessment of Canada's part in the joint United States-Canada air defence programme, I can today announce two major developments: the re-organization of our auxiliary air force and an increase in the number of our regular interceptor squadrons.

Last year I drew the attention of hon. members to the studies being undertaken by the Royal Canadian Air Force to determine whether it was practicable to expect the part-time air crew of the Royal Canadian Air Force auxiliary, however skilled and devoted, to operate all-weather jet interceptors of the complexity of the CF-100 in the role of air defence. This important question, in relation to the overall problem of air defence generally, has con-