

GERMANY IS PAYING THE PRICE

IF Roumania should be utterly obliterated to-morrow it would do no more than prove that the Teutonic powers are able to concentrate with overwhelming strength upon any given point of action. Now if Germany were able to crush Roumania while at the same time holding her ground elsewhere we should indeed have to face a fact of tremendous significance, and one that would relegate the day of peace to a dim and distant future. But this is by no means the situation that confronts us. Germany has been forced to purchase her Roumanian successes, and before we can estimate their true value we must consider the price that she has paid for them. And the price seems to be a very high one. The first item in the bill, and one that it is not easy to measure, is the locking up of a considerable army that was intended for use elsewhere, and a loss of men that can not be replaced. But the other items are even more serious and much more visible. We do not know if there are any Austrians in these Roumanian forces, but we do know that there are Austrians further north, and that the absence of these Austrians from the battle line in Italy has enabled General Cadorna to win a great victory and to bring Trieste within the range of his guns. We are told that the Austrian commanders have notified Vienna that without reinforcements they can not hold Trieste, and we know very well that reinforcements can not be sent to them. This is a part of the price paid for the Roumanian successes, but it is by no means the greater part.


It was said last week that Germany can not now win at two points simultaneously. That fact was already evident, but it is much more evident now. Not only have we the Italian victory to the north of Trieste, but we have a fresh tale of Allied successes on the Somme and at Verdun. The French and British have made another considerable step toward Peronne and Bapaume respectively, and the French at Verdun have taken the village of Vaux and Damloup. Now certain assertions have been made with some authority to the effect that German troops have not been withdrawn from the west for the support of the east, but we need not take such declarations very seriously. They are as much a part of strategy as any of the regular field operations. We must suppose either that the forces in the west have been weakened by extensive withdrawals or that they have lost their morale, and we certainly can not choose the latter alternative. The French at Verdun in the course of a few days' fighting have snatched back every position of value that was taken by the Germans during many months of the bloodiest fighting upon record. In the north we see an Allied advance that is undeniably slow, but that is none the less undeniably steady, and this in the face of fortifications supposed to be impregnable and that were unquestionably of an unprecedented strength. Now the Verdun fighting is even more significant than the fighting on the Somme, because it gives us a basis for comparison. We can compare German successes with French successes, on the same field and for the same prizes. And we find that the tremendous energies put forth by the Germans a few months ago have melted completely away, so much so that the prisoners taken by the French actually outnumbered their own losses from all causes. Now there can be only one possible explanation. The German defensive force had been withdrawn. There were insufficient men to hold the lines, and this not because the lines were not worth holding, but because the demands elsewhere were even more imperative. And it may be said that there is no other tenable theory consistent with German courage and skill.

DOUBTLESS some of the German force at Verdun was sent north to stem the tide on the Somme. But it could not have been a very large force, seeing that it did not stem the tide. The chief beneficiary of the German withdrawals from Verdun was, of course, the Roumanian front and the lines farther north. The eastern battles were sustained at the cost of the western. Success in the east was purchased at the cost of reverses in the west, and we

Unable to concentrate on more than one front, what she gains in Roumania is lost elsewhere. Austria loses Trieste because she can't get troops. Germany loses at Verdun and the Somme

B Y S I D N E Y C O R Y N

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The black line indicates where the Anglo-French line was in early summer. The dotted line where it was a few weeks ago.

may form our own judgments as to the reality of the values received. When we have estimated the German gains in Roumania and set them forth in the war ledger, we may then enter upon the opposite page the events of Trieste, the Somme, and Verdun. It may not be easy to strike a balance, but we may none the less usefully remember that the two pages are actually parts of the same account.

THERE are various ways of measuring the results of the battle of the Somme, but what may be called the foot-rule way is the least accurate of all. None the less it seems to be the most popular. We are invited to look at the map of France and to observe how small is the indentation. It is certainly very small. And then we are invited to compare the depth of that indentation with the total distance to the German frontier. It is, of course, a very slight depth. Now these methods would be quite effective if they were in any way relevant to the aim of the Allies. But they are not relevant. The Allies do not expect to push the Germans back to their frontier by any process of direct pressure. They hope to be able to pierce the German line, which would have just the same effect as piercing a dam. The size of the hole would hardly matter at all. The whole line would have to fall back, and it would indeed be fortunate if it were able to do this without disaster. And if it should prove impossible to pierce the line, as may be the case, they hope so to weaken it by attrition that it shall be compelled to retreat upon a shorter base. These, therefore, are the only points that we need consider—the possibility of piercing the line and so rolling it up like strips of carpet to the north and south, and the alternative course of producing such losses that there shall no longer be men enough to hold the present position.

Now all of the calculations of existing German manpower are speculative, because we do not know the extent of the German losses. None the less, the facts speak for themselves. Germany may be willing

slowly to give up territory on the Somme, to feed it back to her enemies in return for a sufficient price. She herself has said so several times and has therefore admitted a voluntary retirement. But she was certainly not willing to be driven from Verdun. Indeed, the official bulletin spoke of the withdrawal as being "reluctant." She had to give up the Verdun lines because she had not men enough to hold them, nor nearly enough. It would

seem that she has not men enough to complete the speedy conquest of Roumania. We hear even of a reverse in the Dobrudja. Her forces in Russia are barely sufficient to maintain their precarious hold. And in Italy the Austrians have been driven back. Now it may be true that Germany still possesses reserves that might have been used to prevent these misfortunes, but they have been kept in the background for some greater end. This may be true, but at least it is highly unlikely. It is far more probable that Germany is straining every nerve to win a striking success that she may use as a base for some demand for a victorious peace.

AT the moment of writing the best that can be said for Roumania is that she has largely improved her position, but that she is by no means out of the wood. Her armies have rallied in such a way as to justify the belief that they were suffering more from inexperience than from incapacity. They have not only won many successes, but they have taken considerable numbers of prisoners and guns. But, more important than all this, they have held a large German army in the southern field, and they have prevented that army from accomplishing the strategic feat assigned to it of cutting right athwart the Allied line from the far north to Saloniki and throwing itself upon the Russian left flank in Bukovina. The results of the campaign are not to be measured by the bulletins of battles, but by the extent to which those battles aid or retard the general plan. Only by a recognition of the general plan can we estimate its fate or appreciate the true importance of events. Now Germany would certainly not have made so great an effort to crush Roumania merely for a moral effect

nor even to save Hungary from invasion. Her motive was to strike at the Russians to the north, and she has succeeded just so far as she has been able to do this. So far as she has not yet done this, so far as she has been compelled to extend her lines and to devote her treasure of men to that end, so far as she has been damaged and worsted. The questions that we have to ask are, What are the Teutons trying to do in the larger strategy, and how far have they succeeded in doing it?

If Roumania can maintain her morale she ought to be able to see daylight ahead. She is fighting along the whole southern frontier of Transylvania, a distance of some two hundred miles. She is winning at the western end of that line and barely holding her own at the eastern end. The Germans have penetrated into Roumania through the Predale Pass and there were reports that they had taken Kimpolung, some twenty miles in Roumanian territory. But westward from there as far as Orsova the Roumanians seem to have the best of it. Reverting to the comparison between the shape of Roumania and that of a boot, we may say that the Germans are successful at the instep, but that the Roumanians are holding their own from the instep to the toe. North of the instep, at the top of the leg, is the point of contact between the Roumanian and the Russian forces at a place called Dorni Wafra, immediately to the southeast of Kirlibaba in the Carpathians. The Germans are naturally trying to cut through at this point so as to sever communications. If they were able to transport a large force to the vicinity of Dorni Wafra that force would be on the Russian flank. It would constitute a great German success.

To reach that point with a sufficiently large force over the body of a prostrate Roumania may be said to be the chief German objective. Probably Hindenburg would have struck at that point in any case, even if Roumania had not come into the war. With Roumania neutral he could do so in safety from a

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