barism, and an engine of tyranny, which should be got rid of at once. There is generally an outburst of this kind following on some case coming before the Courts in which party politics are more or less mingled. Judges have, of course, in such cases, to give a judgment of some sort which is necessarily displeasing to the losing side, and the political allies of the latter at once go into a phrensy of indignation and abuse the judge much in the same way as the other side would if his judgment had been the other way. In connection with this we venture to express a regret that Chief Justice Cameron should have taken the trouble to allude to any of these attacks. Newspaper criticism of this kind has now arrived at such a point that it has very little effect upon readers at large, and none at all upon intelligent thinking people.

A PERSON signing himself "Barrister," produced lately in the columns of a daily paper an effusion which Chief Justice Cameron, unnecessarily, we think, honoured by referring to in terms all too courteous, if worth noticing at all. Few laymen could have written anything more childish, or evincing more absolute want of any thought on, or knowledge of, the subject discussed by this person. We have too high an opinion of the intelligent education of our Bar to believe that a barrister of Ontario ever wrote the letter at all. One would suppose from the tone of it that hundreds of respectable citizens were pining in our prisons as the victims of the personal malice and wounded spleen of the various Jeffreys of our Bench. One would hardly suppose that, so far as we can remember, there has not been for some thirty years or more, one single lawyer or litigant committed for contempt of court; though it would occasionally have saved much valuable time to the country and pleased an indignant public if the power had been exercised. The power is a most wholesome one, and one that the judges *ought* to have for the benefit of suitors and the public generally. When the judges get into the habit of using it for vindictive purposes it will be time enough to talk about taking it away. At present there is no such indication. "Barrister" and others interested would do well to read and digest the admirable judgments of Willes, J., and Byles, J., in the case of *Re Fernandez*, 10 C. B., N. S. 3, where the whole subject of commitment for contempt is discussed, and the necessity for the existence of the power maintained.

LEGISLATION IN ONTARIO.

WE publish in another column a letter from a correspondent as to recent legislation as affecting decided cases.

In connection with this matter there can be no doubt chapter 26 of the last session of the Ontario Legislature is intended to set at rest some of the difficulties which have arisen under the Fraudulent Preference Act, R. S. O. cap. 118. The opinions of our judges under the last-mentioned Act have been numerous and diverse, and the true interpretation of the Act has not yet been fully settled by the Supreme Court. The main difficulty arose in dealing with the words "with intent to defeat," etc.

Some of the decisions go to show that where a conveyance, assignment, or other instrument mentioned in the Act has the effect of defeating, hindering, or delaying a creditor, the law presumes it to have been executed with that intent.

Such was the decision in *McLean* v. *Garland*, 32 C. P. 524; 10 A. R. 405, where the exact question arose. See, also, *Clark* v. *Hamilton Provident Company*, 21 C. L. J. N. S. 57. So far as the actual intent to