

army as England seldom has to spare for less favoured spots. The direct objects of Imperial concern at the Cape, in a military point of view, are the harbours of Table Bay and Simon's Bay. The subjoined Table will exhibit some of its leading statistics :—

	Population.	Imports into the Colony.	Exports from the Colony.	Amount of Military Force.	Direct Military Expenditure in the Colonies themselves.*
		£.	£.		£.
Cape - - - -	267,006	2,637,192	1,988,406	10,759	649,878
All other Colonies - -	7,615,675	50,452,028	48,052,055	36,492	2,825,994
Total - - -	7,882,671	50,089,220	50,040,461	47,251	2,975,872

It is for Her Majesty's Government to determine the relative claims of different parts of the empire to the assistance of the mother country; but supposing that some reduction of the military expenditure abroad is judged indispensable, it seems a grave fact that a Colony of which the population is one twenty-ninth of the whole population of the British Colonies, and of which the imports and exports are respectively one twenty-second and one twenty-fifth, absorbs more than one-fifth of the whole force allotted to the Colonies, and occasions more than a fourth of the whole direct military expenditure. If we were to omit the Mediterranean garrisons, which evidently are a special class, it would be found that the Cape contained in 1857 one-third of the whole force in the Colonies, and occasioned nearly one-third of the direct military expenditure.

One remark is essential on this Colony. It is commonly said that the Colonists would be willing enough to undertake their own protection provided that they might deal with the Kaffirs as they themselves consider best, but that this would entail a mode of warfare which would not be tolerated by public opinion in England. On the other hand, so long as British authority restrains the settlers from defending themselves in their own way, it is bound to find some efficient substitute. The result has been to produce an excessive drain of British resources for a single Colony; the expenditure, as above shown, is enormous, and it is not likely ever to be materially reduced except by a radical change of policy. Such a change would relieve this country from a heavy burthen, and, so far as concerns the demands both for men and money, would be a palpable gain. Whether it would be opposed to any just claims of philanthropy, or to the general duties of sovereign States towards their subjects, and whether also it would be irreconcilable with public opinion, are questions of a different kind, lying beyond our province. They can only be determined by statesmen engaged in the actual conduct of affairs.

This completes a review of the principal groups of Colonies. The following results may, I think, be drawn from it :—

First. That in British North America and Australia, being the chief assemblages of European communities, a general and intelligible principle about military expenditure is already established.

Secondly, That in the West Indies and on the Coast of Africa the Colonies can neither pay towards the cost of troops, nor yet exist without them, and hence that if such possessions are to be maintained at all, the only question for Government must be what is the smallest force which will answer its purpose.

Thirdly, That it is quite fair that the richer tropical settlements should contribute towards the expense of their garrisons, but that Ceylon and Mauritius are for the present the only Colonies which come within this category, and that both of these may perhaps, if it is thought of importance, be treated alike.

Fourthly, That the most difficult questions must arise with regard to large European settlements in contact with warlike neighbours, such as New Zealand

and

* This is exclusive of recruiting and all other charges at home; of any assumed charge for a proportion of the general dead weight of the army, and is also exclusive of the cost of transport. The returns of population, imports, and exports are taken from the latest Blue Books.