

Supply—National Defence

to air missile for what he called "point defence". The Bomarc is for "area defence"; it has a longer range than the army missile. When we were talking about Bomarc a year ago we were presumably talking about what is now known as the Mark A, though at that time—the minister will correct me if I am wrong—there was no distinction made in our discussions between one type of Bomarc and another type. We assumed there was only one type.

The Mark A, which we were considering a year ago, has been tested only against subsonic targets, and even at limited range and height those tests were only partially successful and are now to be discontinued because this particular weapon is to be discontinued in favour of what is now called the Mark B, which the minister now says is the only Bomarc weapon we ever had in mind for Canada's weapon. It is a solid fuel booster missile, having solid fuel booster rockets for take-off. It has had one test on May 26 against a subsonic, not a supersonic, target; and the test was, we are told, inconclusive.

I do not know whether the minister has had the opportunity to read the testimony given to the House of Representatives subcommittee on the Bomarc weapon, especially the questions asked about this matter by Representative Flood of Pennsylvania. This is what he said, and it is interesting in light of the conclusions the committee came to later with regard to this weapon. He said:

The army had Nike-Ajax. They had Nike-Hercules. Immediately the air force had to have something. They couldn't have that going on. Somebody thought up Bomarc. This was in the early days. Colonel, now you have Bomarc A. You took one shot at one drone at . . . feet and it worked. That is all you have done with Bomarc A at that altitude.

Then he went on:

Here is Bomarc A, the great air force unmanned interceptor. It takes one shot at one pigeon at . . . , it hits, and that is the end of that. You buy it, and we are in procurement. But now you are through buying A's, are you not?

And the colonel to whom he was addressing the question said yes, they had dropped it in favour of Bomarc B. Then Mr. Flood asked:

How many B's have you tested at 400 miles?

The colonel said:

I don't know, sir.

Mr. Flood then went on to say:

So you will scrap A because you have a better one, B, solid fuel, which you have not tested against anything. Yet you are going to buy it because there are a few little gimmicks here and a few little gimmicks there, and you know from experience that since this concerns only the booster solid fuel, and you have had great experience with boosters and solid fuels on aircraft and all that, all these things being equal you are firmly

[Mr. Pearson.]

convinced you should stop buying A which is no good anyhow, after \$2 billion, and go into B which you know nothing about except as our logic and experience indicates. That is Bomarc B and Bomarc A for over \$2 billion.

That was testimony given this spring in Washington. The Senate armed services committee report of May 24, after discussion on the same subject—and no doubt this paragraph is familiar to the minister—had this to say:

The untried Bomarc will be becoming operational—

At least two years away. I continue:

—in the air defence picture at a time when the major emphasis should be on anti-missile defence.

All this means is that the value, effectiveness and timing of the Bomarc—the Bomarc B, if you like—is now under serious attack in the United States, and as a result of that attack the administration has agreed on a compromise between Bomarc missiles and Nike missiles and anti-missile missiles, as a result of which the amount to be spent on our weapon, the Bomarc, is to be reduced by \$925 million over the next five years.

I am informed that its bases in the United States are to be reduced from 30 to 16. Senator Symington, who is a defence critic in the Senate and who was once secretary for air, said of this compromise:

It is merely a guarantee of further waste of billions of dollars.

In spite of United States doubts about this weapon the minister confirmed this morning that we are proceeding with Bomarc bases and SAGE installations in Canada, SAGE installations being essential, I take it, for the effective operation of the Bomarc, without waiting to see what finally happens in the United States with regard to this weapon. When we have asked the minister questions about this we have not received very illuminating replies. The minister has indicated that it is necessary to have the bases ready in case the weapon is a success even though, I suggest, we will have the information on this in lots of time to construct the bases, if necessary, before SAGE could be ready for them. SAGE, we are told, is an essential part of the Bomarc system.

The deputy chief of staff of the United States air force, General Irvine, on April 10, 1959, said that Sage would not be finished for four years. I am wondering if it would not have been good policy to have postponed final consideration of this matter and postponed the initiation of the actual construction until the situation in Washington became a little clearer.

The minister said that the development of the Bomarc B in Washington is proceeding