

dangerous and destabilizing effects. The history of the Cold War appears to support this view as it was a period which witnessed *both* nuclear force building, driven in part by technological innovation and continual efforts at control. Indeed, within a year after dropping the bombs on Japan, Washington was leading a campaign to bring about multilateral control of the spread of nuclear weapons.

In 1946, the American government proposed the Baruch Plan, that advocated the supervised abolition of atomic weapons and the international monopoly of nuclear research and nuclear production for civilian purposes. The process was to be controlled by the International Atomic Development Authority (IADA). Though apparently generous, it would have subjected the Soviet Union to a nuclear world on American terms. Not surprisingly the offer was quickly rejected.⁴² Between 1955 and 1972, various attempts were made to bring out an end to the arms race. In general both superpowers perceived any offer for control as a political strategy to either eliminate a weapon category if one side felt behind, or freeze a weapon category if one side held a clear dominance.⁴³

The politics, indeed it might be said the theatre, of arms control politics, sometimes resulted in a temporary flurry of diplomatic activity with little substantive result. But, although reductions in superpower arsenals remained staled, arms control in selective areas was possible throughout the Cold War. Despite the demise of GCD (General and Complete Disarmament), a number of UN sponsored treaties were signed during the 1960s. In 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty denied states from conducting any further nuclear tests under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space. This was followed in 1967 with the United Nations Outer Space Treaty .

Other important accords were also reached in the late 1960s. After five years of hard negotiations, the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was finally signed in 1967, followed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. This treaty included extensive and intrusive on-site verification measures by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for those countries which signed. France and China did not sign the NPT however, nor did several other near-nuclear states. In 1974, India exploded its first nuclear weapon, signifying the limits of the NPT in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons to countries and regions which posed a particular threat of further proliferation and possible use. Because the NPT also required the nuclear weapons states to seek reductions, something that was very slow in coming, the Treaty became for some states a symbol of the double-standard which the West, and especially, the United States applied when it came to arms control.

⁴² J. Baylis, J. and K. Booth, K. et al. *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies*. (New York: Holmes and Meier Inc.1982), pp. 93-6.

⁴³ G.H. Quester, *Nuclear Diplomacy*. (New York: Dunellen Press, 1970), p. 23.