

The starting point was that compliance with a CWC could best be assured by inspection of the chemical industry to ensure that there was no undeclared production of super-toxic lethal chemicals or key precursors. It was noted that such visits would require industrial co-operation and that they must not compromise industrial secrets. It was stressed that all plants that could produce STLCs should be declared as well as those plants which actually were producing STLCs and key precursors. The former is not yet agreed in the negotiations.

It was assumed that such inspections would be systematic but random, and that the nature of the inspections would depend on whether the plant actually produced STLCs or key precursors, or only had the capability to do so. In the case of actual production, the quantities produced would have to be reconciled with the declarations and a check made on the non-production of undeclared toxic chemicals. The second type of inspections would only need to determine non-production. The paper also noted that the only alternative for checking CW-capable plants was challenge inspection.

The calculations in CD/445 assumed a ratio of 1.8:1 for support staff to inspectors working from headquarters, that inspectors would achieve 40 days/year of inspection, and that a national organization would collect the required basic data.