and compliance assessment — which is hypothetically limited to "judging" — as well as the grey area between them where various types of data collection and information management occur. All of these together, according to this view, are part of the verification process. Does this fundamental bifurcation of "verification" have unexpected implications for some verification enterprises, particularly when undertaken in the multilateral or collective context? Does it depart appreciably from common practice and professional usage?

What is the best way to think about and categorize the whole idea of the verification process? Should analysts try to develop an abstract theoretical account of the process, or should they try to identify or create general categories that can accommodate existing and imaginable verification approaches and techniques? How do they do that? How should categories be designed — according to a generalized understanding of what verification means or inductively, based on existing approaches?

Does the way in which analysts and policy makers structure their thinking about verification categories impose unnecessary constraints on the development of new verification ideas and approaches, or the extension and elaboration of existing ideas in new contexts? Are the usual efforts to develop verification solutions handicapped by too much conventional thinking (i.e., by too much thinking about verification that is tied to existing examples)?

Should the specific needs of arms control agreements structure the thinking of analysts in developing verification "solutions" or should analysts focus more directly on verification itself (in preparation for and in anticipation of a specific negotiation's requirements), and attempt to provide a rich menu of possible approaches, techniques and ideas for policy makers?

Should verification (or, more narrowly, monitoring) as a distinct activity ever be separated from the verification function of specific arms control agreements? Does it make sense to talk about a monitoring regime that is not directly associated with an arms control or confidence-building agreement and a political context? Is the Open Skies proposal an exception or can other similar types of stand-alone verification/confidence-building/monitoring arrangements be imagined? Can they accomplish anything constructive as a general class or are they distractions that risk reducing the effectiveness of arms control agreements with attached verification regimes?

What purposes do arms control agreements really fulfil and how can verification regimes constructively contribute to those agreements (and purposes)? Implicit in this question is the possibility that arms control negotiations and agreements may serve purposes other than those normally associated with the traditional goals of arms control, such as developing force limitations. For instance, can arms control negotiating be viewed as a confidence-building process? Might the purposes change in the future? Might "stability" rather than force limitation come to be an increasingly important goal? How would verification regimes contribute to that? Are stability-enhancing ideas from the world of strategic nuclear arms control in any way transferable to the conventional military arms control sphere? Does current thinking about verification even recognize the importance of various types of stability, or is it narrowly fixed on measuring force reductions or ceilings?

What is an "effective" level of verification performance? What does the concept really entail? What are minimum (least rigorous) standards of verification performance and how can they change depending on other considerations? What are those "other considerations" and how might they make a difference? In particular, what is the role played by the psychology of decision makers and their perceptions of threat (or its absence) in the verification process? Is verification as much a psychological phenomenon as it is a technically informed one? What does this mean for the design of verification regimes? What does it mean for the development of a "theory" of the verification process?