What does this case-study of the TAD teach us about our relations with the European Community? What challenges does Canada face in its relations with the Community in the 1990s?

- 1) The importance of having good relations with the key Member States of the Community such as the UK, Germany, France, and Italy, whose cooperation was essential in ensuring a Canadian TAD. But this is not to ignore contributions of other Member States such as Spain and Portugal.
- 2) The very fact that Canada inserted itself into a EC-US negotiation process may reinforce the 'two-pillar' syndrome, and may make it difficult for European decision-makers to clearly distinguish Canadian from American interests.
- The establishment through the TAD of high-level, new political links between the Canadian PM and the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, as well as between the Canadian SSEA and the President of the Council of the European Communities is unobjectionable, even laudable, and demonstrates a) Canada's recognition of the European Community's role as an increasingly active international actor, and b) Canada's desire to have more balanced bilateral relations, i.e. broadened out from their traditional irritant-driven focus. Nevertheless, the TAD must not be permitted to become a substitute for substantive results. Expectations for its ability to move bilateral relations to a new plateau must not be so unrealistic so as to undermine its utility. The motivations of both the EC and Canada in issuing it must be clear.
- This paper raises a key question that is perhaps tangential to the actual analysis of the TAD as a political document: Is tinkering with bilateral economic relations (i.e., signing an agreement on competition policy, having a standards MRA etc.) under the broad framework of the TAD an optimal approach to enhancing bilateral economic relations? There may, in fact, be some wisdom in re-examining the utility of a trans-Atlantic free trade agreement after the Uruguay Round.
- As a postscript, the announcement of Canadian troop withdrawal from Western Europe by 1994, which has elicited notes of disappointment from Canada's NATO allies especially the United Kingdom and Germany will, by default, enhance the Community's role as the key pillar of Canada's European policy framework. This in turn will further challenge Canada to effectively utilize its new high level political access, stipulated under the TAD, to replace the access to the Member States and the Community that will be lost as Canada's influence in NATO and the CSCE wanes.