
system. He noted the experience to date with several types of verification agreements and pointed to the need for timely planning prior to the conclusion of a chemical weapons agreement.

In the sixth session, Professor Nicholas Kyriakopoulos of George Washington University discussed the nature of technological change in general, its effects on verification and the difficulties that the IAEA encountered when it incorporated technological change (such as new methods of information processing and automated inspections) into its verification procedures. He concluded with recommendations for improvement in the IAEA and for monitoring a chemical weapons agreement.

The final session in this category took a slightly different view of the IAEA. Whereas earlier papers discussed aspects of the IAEA from an international perspective, Eric Payne of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), focussed on the national (that is, Canadian) infrastructure for implementing IAEA safeguards. He discussed inspections at the AECL Research Co. and at other Canadian facilities, the infrastructure for monitoring and the manpower requirements for accommodating IAEA safeguards inspections in Canada.

Applicability of IAEA Procedures and Experience

This category of topics consisted of two discussion sessions.

The first session was an extended discussion of organizational matters as they relate to a chemical weapons agreement. This session was moderated by Johan Molander of Sweden's delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, who, in his preliminary remarks, stressed the lessons from the IAEA experience in addressing the problems of: creating an effective executive council; providing for appropriate financial underpinning; and assuring adequately trained and supported personnel for the verification organization. The ensuing discussion concentrated mainly on organizational matters, especially on the problems of creating an effective executive council. Financial and confidentiality issues were also discussed.

The second session, chaired by Ron Cleminson of Canada's Department of External Affairs, focussed on avoiding mistakes in setting up an international inspectorate. Each participant was asked to identify or suggest at least one mistake (presumably made in the IAEA system) that should be avoided in a chemical weapons verification system. This approach brought out some of the central issues that were discussed during the conference.

The workshop closed with the concluding remarks by Harriet Critchley. In referring to Dr. Keeley's description of the similarities in requirements for