

ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometres, and theatre, or short-range nuclear forces, with ranges of less than 500 kilometres. Several days afterwards, Gorbachev went further by suggesting that all three categories of weapons should be abolished in Europe.

However, the prospect of total elimination exacerbated difficulties within the alliance by lending support to the views of those Europeans who maintained that such agreements 'decoupled' Europe from the US nuclear guarantee, and left the Soviets with an advantage in conventional forces. After a further round of discussions within the alliance, it became clear that the NATO alliance would not accept the inclusion of short-range missiles in a superpower agreement. In any event, the Reagan administration argued, it was impossible to verify such an agreement.

In response to the Gorbachev proposal, on 15 June Reagan announced US support for a total ban on SRINF provided that it was an integral part of an INF Treaty. Echoing a suggestion made previously by US negotiators in Geneva, he urged the Soviets to consider also a total ban on LRINF. As Kenneth Adelman, then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, commented, "it would be far simpler, by orders of magnitude, to verify a ban on [these] systems than it would be to verify compliance with numerical limits." On 22 July the Soviets agreed to what became known as the 'double zero' proposal, thus paving the way for a global ban on all missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres.

The INF Treaty

With the scope of an agreement defined in the early summer, and in the expectation that an INF Treaty would not be tied to the resolution of other negotiations at Geneva, there remained one outstanding policy disagreement prior to the technical drafting of the treaty language. That disagreement concerned the 72 Pershing IAs which were deployed in Germany. With a range of 740 kilometres, these constituted SRINF. The Soviets insisted that they be included in the treaty, but since the missiles (but not the warheads) were owned and controlled by West Germany, the United States claimed that they could not be included. The outcome was a compromise which left intact NATO's insistence that third-party systems could not be negotiated in a bilateral treaty: on 26 August Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced that West Germany would be prepared to dismantle the Pershing IAs subject to the satisfactory completion, ratification, and implementation of an INF treaty which provided for the global elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces.

With this final issue resolved, negotiators pressed ahead with the treaty draft in order to prepare a final, if somewhat rushed, text for signature at the summit meeting on 8 December 1987. The lengthy and complex text, together with two Protocols and a Memorandum of Understanding, essentially established agreement on the following: the mis-

sile systems to be eliminated; notification of the numbers, types and locations of the missiles to be eliminated; and inspection provisions to verify both that missiles are eliminated as agreed, and, in the longer term, to verify that new missiles are not built and deployed.

Missiles Banned by the Treaty

In order to reach agreement on the procedures necessary for verification of the complete destruction of all banned weapons, the INF negotiators agreed to a comprehensive exchange of information giving the numbers of missiles and launchers deployed, support structures such as transporter vehicles, the number of non-deployed missiles and launchers, and spare rocket stages. This information — contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Database — meant that, for the first time, the Soviet Union provided an official, detailed list of every missile including its exact location.

In regard to LRINF, the figures contained no surprises, but there were two interesting anomalies in the SRINF data. First, the Soviet figures for deployed SS-12/22s and SS-23s were almost twice as high as previously published US estimates, suggesting that national intelligence might be less reliable than had previously been thought. Curiously, in the ratification debate in the United States little was made of this point, despite the opportunities that it provided for critics of the treaty. Second, the treatment of the Pershing IA reflected the negotiating compromise: the United States declared 169 non-deployed Pershing IAs in storage at Pueblo, Colorado, but none actually deployed. The Pershing IA was therefore recognized as an accountable missile, but it was left to the West Germans to declare their own position on the missiles owned and deployed on West German soil.

It should also be noted that the database exchange covered only missiles and not warheads. Having already agreed that both sides were entitled to remove and retain or otherwise modify the warheads, the negotiators were able to avoid the added complexity of identifying the numbers of warheads and verifying their destruction. The INF database exchange, therefore, was both a landmark in itself — it provided an official, detailed statement of weapons deployed and warehoused — and also an indication of the greater complexity that lay ahead. In a strategic weapons treaty that involves the actual destruction of warheads and in chemical weapons and conventional force negotiations, agreement about the data exchange, and the extent to which the rival powers are willing to release sensitive information about force developments, will be central to the successful conclusion of negotiations.

Verifying the Treaty

It is likely that the principal means of verifying the treaty, as with the previous SALT agreements, will be through national technical means. Article 12 of the treaty,