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TWO MAIN THEMES EMERGED FROM THIS BABBLE OF REVULSION TOWARDS the hostilities, and Canada's role. The first focussed on the ethics of violence: the second revolved around the efficacy of international institutions.

"Our analysis," explains Project Ploughshare's Ernie Regehr, who comes from a Mennonite background, "is based on the notion of what constitutes a 'Just War'." Just War theory allows for the use of military violence against an aggressor, so long as the risk of civilian death and damage is restricted. "But our conclusion was that, given the level of destruction that modern warfare produces, and the inability to distinguish between civilian and military targets, modern war as a deliberate, chosen policy has become unacceptable."

In theory, Project Ploughshares members accepted police action to enforce economic sanctions, for example, and therefore supported those Canadians in the Gulf whose job was to monitor sanctions. But in practice, their "Just War" analysis meant that the sanctions could only be enforced by surveillance, not military action. This logic would have paralyzed coalition partners in cases of blatant sanctions-busting. "If the non-military sanctions proved unenforceable," says Regehr, "then you've lost the fight anyway. Wholesale sanctions-busting would have proved that there was no consensus among coalition partners to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait."

For many observers, Project Ploughshares' objections to the Gulf War were agonizingly impractical, however, Regehr's arguments – sanctions, yes; war, never – had considerable appeal to Canadians who distrusted Washington's motives. Explains Leyton-Brown, "It was not simply anti-Americanism. Many people were suspicious of the use of US military techniques, and its attempted domination of the third world to protect its oil interests. You heard a lot of statements from this group to the effect that if Kuwait didn't have oil, the US wouldn't be there."

ANOTHER BLOC WITHIN THE PEACE MOVEMENT ARRIVED AT ITS SUSPICION of US actions via a different route. This group included some of the self-styled Pearsonites who, since the early 1950s, have lobbied for a more effective UN. "These people," explains Leyton-Brown, "had argued throughout the Cold War that superpower polarity could be reduced if collective security mechanisms were allowed to work." For some UN supporters, the Gulf War was the UN's finest hour, but other internationalists argued that the war had triggered a wrenching distortion of the UN Charter. They were concerned that Canada's involvement would prejudice its historic role as an international peace-keeper.

of 15 January, Grenville-Wood argued vigorously in a letter to Joe Clark, that this put the UN "at grave risk."

The UNA supported the use of sanctions, but deplored the rush to aggression before the effect of sanctions had been evaluated. Grenville-Wood avoids accusing the US of outright manipulation of the UN, but admits, "There was no question that Security Council votes were obtained through some pretty heavy-hitting from the US and the UK." As a result of these misgivings, Grenville-Wood and the UNA split with the UN line.

HOW MUCH IMPACT ON CANADA'S conduct during the war did these various arguments have? The peace movement's effect was perhaps more evident in government statements on Canada's post-war role, suggests John Lamb, director of the Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, "I think that the speeches that Clark and Mulroney made in February, on the need for post-war controls on the arms trade, were a direct response to the public's concern about how this war started in the first place."

Today, despite the efforts of groups like CPPNW to maintain public concern about the Gulf situation, the brief frenzy within the peace movement appears to have abated. "My impression," admits Leyton-Brown, "is that we've returned to the status quo ante." When peace activists had to face a real conflict, involving a ruthless leader with apparently limitless ambitions, their responses did not stretch much beyond a denunciation of war. In the end, opinion polls revealed that the majority of Canadians supported the UN-sanctioned coalition, and were prepared to face the costs of hostilities. Canadian politicians took their cue from the polls, not the placards waved outside their windows. □

legacy of Lester Pearson, a squabble on to remind *Globe and Mail* readers -minded as required. "L.B. Pearson of collective security required the Se- gression by force ... the Canadian pres- verage where it counts. L.B. Pearson um advantage of that fact." esident of the United Nations Association e Gulf War as a golden opportunity for neglect. For the first time ever, in Au- was unanimous. Its members agreed that wrong, and the US State Department ap- is muscles. Grenville-Wood watched with y baby step in its series of resolutions, ; with back-up military support. whether participants were following the ly. Who was actually running the show? N integrated military command structure " explains Grenville-Wood, "but surely put one together?" When an additional li Arabia in November, Grenville-Wood gs. And when Resolution 678 was rizing the use of "all necessary means" t withdrawn its troops by the deadline

