

ago, we called attention to the unsatisfactory condition of our cavalry, and suggested the formation of a cavalry association, in the belief that such an organization would be found quite as useful to this branch as to the artillery or the riflemen. Our suggestion was very favourably received by influential members of the cavalry, but unfortunately no one seemed anxious to take the initiative in action in the direction suggested. Evidently Canada has to contend with the difficulty felt in the Mother Country, in the absence of cavalry leaders, as touched upon in the lecture reprinted elsewhere in this issue.

COMMENTING upon this "cavalry revival," the *Broad Arrow* has an editorial passage of special interest to Canadians from the high compliment incidentally paid to the gallant officer recently in command of our militia:—

"If this revival goes on, as we have said, but slowly, the main reason is that for years neither at the headquarters staff nor among the senior officers of the cavalry has there been any one officer of the arm possessing sufficient practical enthusiasm or personal influence to lead the movement. When garrison instruction was introduced into the army in 1870, a keen observer of military matters, a general officer—whose prevision in this instance was at fault—remarked that garrison instruction was destined to failure because there was no enthusiast at its head; and he ascribed the success of the musketry instruction to the fact that a 'lunatic' on the subject had been put in charge. Garrison instruction did, however, grow rapidly and flourish, because the officer appointed to carry it out, Major Middleton (now General Sir F. Middleton), was, if not altogether an enthusiast, a man of strong character, with a good stiff back-bone, and one who could speak out his mind when he chose to do so. Sir F. Middleton's services to this branch of military training have never, in our opinion, received their deserved meed of acknowledgment. Germany had its Prince Frederic Charles, France its Gallifet, and if circumstances had let England keep its Valentine Baker, the enthusiast possessing personal influence would have assumed a similarly commanding position in our army."

A CORRESPONDENT, an extract from whose letter we print in our Rifle News, writes to the *Volunteer Service Gazette* in advocacy of greater prominence being given to the team competitions at Bisley, and incidentally makes mention of "the absence of that courteous official attention" due to the Colonial riflemen competing for the Kolapore cups. We are sure that the Canadians, whilst they would of course have valued any official indications of appreciation of the plucky attempt they made, felt no resentment at any seeming neglect, the unvarying kindness extended to our teams being a sufficient evidence of the good will felt towards them. Unquestionably, however, it would be in the interest of rifle shooting to give mere prominence to the team competitions, which alone are of interest to the general public.

MENTION of Bisley brings to mind the fact that the command and adjutancy of our team for 1891 are still the subject of much speculation, though two very likely names are prominently mentioned. These are, for the command, Major B. A. Weston, 66th Princess Louise Fusiliers, Halifax; and for the adjutancy, Major W. M. Blaiklock, 5th Royal Scots, Montreal. Each is the Secretary of the association of his province, and in that capacity has done service for rifle shooting entitling him to share in the

honours of our representative team. The appointments will not be made until after the annual business meeting, but should the two officers above named be the choice, we feel sure they will fill the positions with credit to themselves and advantage to the team.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CAVALRY ACTION.

(United Service Gazette.)

On Thursday, 8th January, before the Aldershot Military Society, Major W. C. James, D.A.A.G., 16th Lancers, lectured on this subject before a very large audience. The chair was occupied by Major-General J. Keith Fraser, C.M.G., commanding Dublin District.

The lecturer, having alluded to the attention in military circles that is being paid to this subject, said: The first duty devolving upon the cavalry at the outset of the campaign will be to cover the mobilization of their own armies and the transport of their troops to the frontier. The Germans themselves admit that in this portion of their duty their cavalry failed in 1879, a failure, however, which mattered little, thanks to the still more glaring want of enterprise or indeed of any definite plan on the part of their opponents. The German cavalry was certainly kept very much to the rear during the first days of the campaign, and in the memoirs of individual regiments we read curious accounts of how the Sixth Cavalry Division came up to Saarbuck the day after the battle of August 6th, and how the Fourth Cavalry Division arrived on the battlefield of Weissenburg too late to do more than listen to the story of the fight as told by the infantry, and spent the day of the battle of Worth in bivouac ten miles away at Sulz.

We may certainly expect in the next campaign to see much more enterprise on the part of the cavalry from the very commencement of the campaign, and probably attempts will be made on either side to interfere with the mobilization of the enemy's troops. There can be no doubt as to the rôle that cavalry will have to play after concentration of the forces and commencement of operations. This rôle comprises, broadly speaking, the duties of exploration and security. When the cavalry divisions are acting directly in front of the armies, the patrols from the Cavalry carrying out the duties of security will merely have to go for information to the former; but as a rule the exploring cavalry will be acting in a direction more or less differing from the main line of advance, seeking to avoid the masses of the enemy, and to gain their flanks. The "cavalry of security" must then push forward a fresh échelon in front of the main bodies to take up the duties of reconnaissance, whenever the exploring cavalry, by moving to a flank, has left the front uncovered.

It is no longer considered sufficient to form a "screen" in front of the infantry columns; such a screen is of a stationary and delusive character, and can be formed by the infantry advanced guards and outposts. Cavalry must act on the offensive and take the initiative. There are a great many cavalry soldiers who maintain that cavalry should never get off their horses or fight with any weapon but the *arme blanche*. This view rests mainly on the fact, which is never disputed, that cavalry is essentially an arm of offence. But it must be remembered that in cases of strategical offensive operations there may, in fact, be frequent occasions for the employment of defensive tactics. A cavalry division pushes on into the enemy's country and seizes an advanced position, a village, or other important locality, where it must defend itself till the main body comes up. Here is an opportunity for dismounted action, and for this the best firearm is necessary. What does Von Schmidt say? "I want no infantry; my cavalry must help