

As against this will, of course, be urged all that we have heard for so many weary years—the impossibility of depending upon treaties or undertakings as between nations. But surely this objection overlooks the fact that the policy of the Balance of Power and the present resistance to Germany are themselves based upon agreements between nations; and between nations that by their characters have as little natural affinity as could well be imagined. In the present system of the Balance of Power we have international co-operation and combination between Servia, Japan, Russia, England, France, Belgium, and Portugal. Who would have said five years ago that England could by any possibility have found herself the ally of Servia? Or fifteen years ago who would have prophesied that England would be fighting to promote a Russian policy?

The facts of the present war show that we have already reached that stage at which we are *obliged* to depend for our safety upon the co-operation of nations with which we may have very serious causes of disagreement and conflict. For years our Australian fellow-subjects have been fearing the aggression of Japan, providing against it. Japan has been for a long time the prospective enemy most in their minds, yet that does not prevent the Australians being for this circumstance the allies of the Japanese. What should therefore prevent nations otherwise divided becoming for a special occasion and circumstance—*i.e.*, the breaking of the peace by one member of the society of nations—allies and co-operators? There are, of course, other difficulties of detail. Who is the aggressor? Our experience in this war shows that we can bring certain tests as to offensive as opposed to defensive action : mobilization