

brass tacks, was to establish force parity between the two super-powers and thus to provide a basis on which future understanding might be reached. (This, incidentally, will have to be done in MBFR as well if it comes to negotiations on this subject, as now seems likely; the thorny road trodden in SALT I cannot be avoided.) The next step is to apply the principle of parity to gradual, balanced reductions of armaments.

This task will be tackled in SALT II. It will no doubt be an extremely difficult one. Reductions of armaments will have to be related to each side's perception of its security requirements, and these are quite different in many respects. Under such circumstances, arriving at acceptable trade-offs will pose enormous problems.

In a recent issue of *Newsweek* magazine, a U.S. official was quoted as saying that "progress will be slow". "Compared to SALT II, SALT I is going to look like a lightning process," the article declared. This is probably true, though regrettable — and perilous, if for no other reason than that, with every year that passes without substantive progress toward nuclear-arms control, the danger of nuclear proliferation increases sharply. Still, it is too early to say what will happen at SALT II. It is certain that, if it has come about at all, it is because there was SALT I, and this in itself is something to enter on the credit side of the ledger. Where arms control is concerned (let alone disarmament, which has not even been tackled yet in earnest), one has to be thankful for small mercies.

Military balance intact, political effects less certain

The SALT agreements are clearly the most significant outcome of the Moscow summit. . . . These agreements will not, however, end active competition in strategic missiles. Within the agreed numbers, both sides are free to modernize and improve their missile systems.

Thus the United States can continue to install multiple guided warheads (MIRVs) on its *Minuteman* ICBMs and in its *Polaris* submarines, or indeed to develop new missile submarines. By 1975 or so, the United States would . . . have about three times as many warheads as the Soviets though each would be much smaller.

Conversely, the U.S.S.R. will have at least three times as much destructive force (megatonnage) as the United States. And as the U.S.S.R. develops its own MIRVs (as it surely will), its greater number of missiles and the enormous size of its 300 SS-9's should enable it eventually to surpass the United States in total warheads.

. . . The prospect is that the U.S.S.R. will ultimately have 30 to 50 percent more strategic missile-launchers and submarines, with several times as much megatonnage, and potentially could have more warheads. Some people will fear that this disparity will give the Soviets military "superiority". In military terms, this concern seems to have been mistaken. . . . As long as the U.S.S.R. could not hope to disarm the United States by a first

strike, it will be deterred from purposely initiating nuclear war. In those terms, the interim agreement will not upset the military balance.

Its political effects are less certain. Will the U.S.S.R. conclude that its relative "superiority" could be converted into greater leverage or influence in trouble spots like the Middle East or even in Western Europe? . . . If it does, the effect could be destabilizing and very dangerous. . . .

In U.S. domestic politics, the agreements are likely to sharpen and polarize the debate over military spending. One group will stress the growing Soviet power Others will rely on the agreements in pressing for major cuts in the military budget Actually, these pacts provide no real basis for substantial savings. . . . Any major savings will depend on whether the interim agreement leads to further restrictions. . . .

The effort to achieve further restrictions should be pursued with vigour and patience. The reduction of the armaments burden could be a genuinely shared interest of the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of parity if the Soviets are willing to forego efforts to gain political advantage from illusory "superiority". (*Excerpts from an analysis by Dr. Robert R. Bowie, director of the Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, in the Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 1972.*)