

why it should not be reaffirmed. Agreement to do so would create a climate of cooperation that would extend into other, more controversial areas.

The Western powers have felt that this is not good enough. They are chary of pieces of paper that might prove to be meaningless. They have become weary of the idea of meetings for what they consider to be propaganda purposes. The younger generation, particularly, feels this sort of exercise is no longer sufficient, and its disillusionment with what it calls the establishment will be the greater if CSCE accomplishes nothing more concrete than statements of principle. Thus the West has pressed to know in more precise terms what will be on the agenda, to know how the items will be developed and to define the advance possible areas of agreement. As the communiqué issued after the NATO ministerial meeting in Bonn put it:

"... the aim of Allied Governments of the multilateral preparatory talks would be to ensure that their proposals were fully considered at a conference and to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a conference could produce satisfactory results."

In other words, the West has sought careful preparation and a good deal of preliminary spade-work before a conference is convened. The Western powers want an understanding not only of what specific topics will be discussed but of the chances of agreement on them. It may well be that some are best left out of the CSCE format. Construction of pipelines or power-lines could be negotiated directly by those wishing to use them.

MBFR complexity

MBFR is one issue that required a separate forum because only members of the two alliances were directly involved. This is an extraordinarily complex issue. There is a general agreement that mutual and balanced force reduction is desirable and that it should be achieved in such a way that none of the nations of Europe emerge feeling any less secure than they do today. At their meeting in Bonn in May 1970, the NATO foreign ministers set criteria. Mr. Brezhnev is understood to have found them generally acceptable. These criteria were:

(a) Mutual force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side, having regard for differences arising from geographical and other considerations.

- (b) Reductions should be on the basis of reciprocity and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing.
- (c) Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the area concerned.
- (d) There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reduction.

These criteria are much easier to formulate than they will be to implement. The *Strategic Survey 1971*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, put the problem this way:

"SALT, by comparison, is much simpler, having to deal with a small number of discrete and well-understood weapon systems, in discussions which are bilateral. In MBFR, there is a host of weapons systems and forces and the possibility of a multitude of parties. SALT became possible because the Soviet Union had reached effective parity and could discuss equal reductions, whereas equal reductions in Europe, starting from a basis of inequality, are unbalancing by nature and unpredictable in their effect."

Unilateral U.S. cuts

One of the difficulties that can never be overlooked is the need to abstain from unilateral force reductions, especially by the United States. The Nixon Administration has resisted attempts to reduce U.S. forces in Europe and the Mansfield amendment aimed at such reductions was defeated in Congress this year. However, some such proposal may win the support of Congress, and that in turn could jeopardize MBFR. If the United States were to reduce its forces unilaterally, why should the U.S.S.R. follow suit? Another consequence, as has been noted, might be the development of a European defence community and a subsequent split between Europe and North America. The end result would not affect the security of Eastern Europe, but it might weaken that of the West.

It is now generally accepted that a single conference will accomplish little and that there will have to be either a series of meetings, linked by working groups dealing with specific subjects, or some form of continuing machinery to examine problems of European security and cooperation. This accounts for the Warsaw Pact's proposal for creation of a "body to deal with questions of security and cooperation in Europe". It is interesting to recall that a proposal for a European Se-

If U.S. to cut forces unilaterally 'why should U.S.S.R. follow suit?'