

Trustees is so devised as to make these bodies second his purposes and acquiesce in his decisions. The present constitution of the Boards of School Trustees seems to have been designed with a view expressly to sustain the power of the Chief Superintendent. In like manner the principal clauses of the Common School Act, if examined carefully, will be found to aim at securing this same object. However, in order to understand exactly the nature and extent of the unconstitutional power which the Chief Superintendent is able to bring to bear on the Governor General, on the Ministry and on every Member of the House of Assembly and Legislative Council, it is necessary to analyze the different sources of that power; and to do this we must first go back to 1850, and review the motives by which its concoctors were influenced.

In the first place, the exorbitant patronage and unconstitutional power here referred to, arose out of two elements. One, the ambition of Lord Elgin to acquire popularity. The other, the influence at that time of Dr. Ryerson over the Methodist Conference, and as a popular agitator. The part played by Lord Elgin is not yet properly estimated; but, as the instrument through whom and by whom the rights of the Municipal Councils and the General Government were bartered away and sold for a certain measure of Common School popularity, we are justified in imputing to him, and to him alone, all the blame. To him we are indebted for the legacy of Independent Boards of School Trustees and an almighty Chief Superintendent. Dr. Ryerson, in so far as personal considerations and a desire to improve his private fortune, coupled with the somewhat excusable vanity of being considered a Canadian educational Goliath, may be said to have acted as any unscrupulous person would have done if placed in his circumstances. Perceiving the object of Lord Elgin's ambition, and also the suitability of the position of each to exchange mutual advantages, he embraced the opportunity not only to secure patronage and its emoluments, but to intrench himself and fortify his official position so as to be able to intimidate and to act defensively against the Legislature, whenever it should so happen that his individual aspirations might require the exercise of such intimidation or defensive action. Now the method which he adopted to intrench and fortify himself, and by which he now exercises a power of intimidation over the Legislature, is that which I am desirous to show was unconstitutional. I am desirous to show that the creation of a ramified chain of irresponsible patronage was the creation of an independent power within the state, incompatible with the independence of the Legislature; and that [the proper depository of this patronage should be a Department of the Executive, presided over by a Minister, who should be responsible to the representatives of the people in Parliament, and to the people themselves at the hustings.

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