

- (c) the centralization of defence matters under the authority of only one minister.
- (d) The potential impact of military expenditures and armament production on economic activity in Canada.
- (e) The effects upon employment of a reduction in the defence budget.
- (f) Policies related to research and development.

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The Committee wishes to express its sincere appreciation to its Clerk, members of Committees Branch, the other personnel of the House of Commons and all those persons in Canada and abroad whose devotion to duty and co-operation has greatly assisted the Committee in its work.

97. The possibility of a surprise attack from the Soviet against any NATO member and of the instantaneous retaliation with all the nuclear offensive powers of the United States and its allies cannot be ignored.

98. Conventional war breaks out more easily. We were witness to several such occurrences since the end of the 1938-1945 war. The most serious one was without any doubt the Korean war. Nowadays war remains essentially conventional as long as it does not involve the direct participation of the United States and the Soviets in the same war. If the two great opponents were to participate directly in a war, the latter would almost certainly become nuclear.

99. As long as the nuclear weapons of the USSR are matched by the United States missile systems, Strategic Air Command, Polaris firing nuclear submarines and a number of other American nuclear weapons, and until one side or the other perfects an anti-missile missile it is unlikely that a nuclear war will break out.

100. This Committee recommends that the United States remain neutral in the development and production of nuclear weapons.

(a) That the United States remain neutral in the development and production of nuclear weapons.

101. In order to follow up chapter eight further time is required to examine the proposal that NATO members participate in the planning and targeting of nuclear weapons to be available for use on authority of the United States of America.

CHAPTER IX—DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

102. The Committee could not study in all its details the organization of the Department of National Defence, but after the evidence given by the chief of staff and many other witnesses, it can point out some problems which it intends to examine when it resumes its activities during the next session. These are:

- (a) Nature and extent of civilian control.
- (b) The organization of the chief of staff structure.