Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: The Montreal Engineering Company in 1961, after the treaty was signed, made a theoretical study in which they said that they did not like forecasting for long periods ahead. They made a theoretical study on the assumed basis of load growth at periods of six, eight, and ten years, and they gave an estimation of costs of power under those three conditions. But the trouble in forecasting power costs that far ahead is that none of us know what conditions will be in 10, 15, or 20 years.

I do not like to call it a forecast any more than does Montreal Engineering, but rather an assumption that has to be made of load growth and of use of generated power. In my opinion, as soon as you get beyond five years, you are on very questionable ground. I venture to suggest that in the next 15 years you will see lower generating costs by atomic power. Five years ago I would not have said this—with the exception of the very lowest cost hydro zones.

Mr. PUGH: As to costs, though, is it not generally accepted among engineers that now is the time to build power dams, and that if you delay, you may well lose the opportunity?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: Well, sir, I would like to make the prediction that I think the costs of Cadillacs are going to go up very substantially in the next five years, and that we are going to have better cars then. Therefore we should lay in a stock of Cadillacs to keep us going for the next 25 years. I can see no difference in the two philosophies.

Mr. PUGH: I can only direct your attention to appendix No. 3 of the Montreal Engineering Company report of March, 1964, which shows all power development in British Columbia, including the Peace river project, to be phasing in. The graph of course goes to 1990, and it shows an orderly constant line up of annual energy requirements and also of December peak loads on the Columbia, including the Canal Flats diversion, Murphy creek, and seven mile, and also including 49-10, Mica plants, on the Kootenay itself, that is the west Kootenay, plus the Canal plants, and it shows that British Columbia's requirements will hardly be met by these by 1989. Do you not think that is a fair assumption?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: No, sir; I think it is ridiculous for anybody to start predicting requirements 25 years in advance. Montreal Engineering Company point out how dangerous it is, and that they do not like doing it. I have their report here.

Mr. PUGH: With the Peace river project coming in now, would you say that possibly the Columbia should not be started at all in any phase?

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: I did not say that.

Mr. PUGH: No, but I would like to get your views on it, if you are only going to look five years ahead.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: I stated this afternoon what I think is the proper program for the Columbia. I would build Mica and Duncan at somebody else's expense, and that is as far as I would go. After all, it does not cost you anything, and that is fine. But as for putting a 1,800,000 kilowatt plant in at Mica, as we are talking about in the white paper here, it is just incredible to me.

Mr. PUGH: No, but I think that has cleared up my point on that. You mentioned the bible of the United States engineers.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: What is that?

Mr. PUGH: The bible of the United States engineers.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: No, I said this is the bible of the hydrological, power, and economic features of the Columbia basin.

Mr. PUGH: The whole basin.