

system could be an appropriate verification technology, it would be both reasonable and cost-effective for this space-based verification capability to be generated by a group of capable nations and provided for use under the auspices of the United Nations or a regionally-based IVO in the context of the agreement(s).

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that in a very imperfect world where suspicion, uncertainty and lack of trust all too frequently characterize international relations, we must seek to ensure compliance with arms control agreements through adequate verification. Perhaps one day, in a better world, we may not need such requirements; but for the present time, to achieve and maintain the trust essential for sound and effective arms control and disarmament agreements and thereby build international peace and security, we must have effective verification.

As Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, said recently in the Canadian House of Commons:

"Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust. The priority attention Canada has given to verification issues ... attacks this question directly. Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security. Verification justifies that confidence."