

than as arenas of conflict between right and wrong; where popularity with press and radio and television audiences goes less to the searcher for a solution than to him who emerges as the stoutest, or at least the most vociferous and violent champion of the right.

This tendency for diplomacy to degenerate into popular appeal, resulting in adulation or denunciation (the two often follow each other in quick succession) is largely the result of communist tactics. Such tactics were laid down and built into a system by Trotsky as long ago as 1918 at the Brest-Litovak negotiations, when he tried to appeal to the people over the heads of the government with whom he was supposed to be negotiating. But the fact that the primary fault is communist does not make it any wiser for national representatives of free states to treat international conferences chiefly as opportunities to make resounding speeches which are designed primarily to go down well with the audiences back home. Vigorous replies to false and vicious communist charges are, of course, often essential. In the face of some propaganda attacks silence could be interpreted as acquiescence. But let us not deceive ourselves that such diplomacy is other than a deplorable necessity. To be merely anti-communist is not enough. If it were, Hitler would be on a very high pedestal in history.

That is why it is not, in my view, naive to take some satisfaction out of the fact that in the current session of the United Nations General Assembly on two important issues, disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Western and the Communist countries were able to agree, if only on procedural questions.

It is, I think, not inconceivable that the improvement in atmosphere, and in diplomatic habits and manners, which these two developments illustrate, may contribute to a gradual but genuine easing of tensions. This may give later and more important negotiations on substantive questions, a better chance of success.

We remember, of course, that these United Nations developments are in line with the current Soviet "peace offensive." That "offensive" may only be a tactical move in a strategy which remains threatening and unchanged. But tactics may have their effect on habits and attitudes and, ultimately, even on policies. We cannot base our plans on the probability of such a good result but we can and should be ready to take advantage of it, if and when it occurs. To that end we have some ground for encouragement though none for complacency or wishful thinking, in the somewhat better international climate of today.

In our vigorous and uneasing effort to transform what improvement there has been into real progress towards peace we should be prudent, without losing our vision. President Eisenhower