


Figure 11.5


Canadian Exports from the Americas, 1990-1996  
(millions of \$)

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics 1990-1996* (Washington: IMF, 1997).

trade deficit with Latin America went from \$1.7 billion to \$3.7 billion during the same period (IMF, 1997).

To the extent that an opening to the region was meant to weaken Canada's trade dependence, either directly, through simple trade diversification, or indirectly, by enabling Canada to use the secure market base of NAFTA as a spring board towards world markets, strategic regionalism (Deblock and Brunelle, forthcoming) has proved to be a major disappointment. Admittedly, the enormous role of the automotive sector in this dynamic somewhat exaggerates the importance of integrated production processes at the North American level (Molot, 1997: 173-8). Yet, given that this sector is the core of Canada's manufacturing base, its consolidation as the spine of a North

Figure 11.6

Canadian Exports to Selected Regions, 1990-1996  
(millions of \$)

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics 1990-1996* (Washington: IMF, 1997).

American economy including Mexico must certainly be considered a major post-Cold War development. However, Canada's export promotion to Latin America (including Mexico) compares unfavourably with its ability to penetrate the US market, where exports grew from \$95 billion to \$164 billion between 1990 and 1996 (IMF, 1997).

The commercial basis for Canada's integration into the whole hemisphere in fact appears to be shrinking. One could perhaps argue that political and cultural relations do not necessarily need such a basis to flourish, but one would have a hard time justifying them given the policy framework outlined in the 1995 government statement on foreign policy (DFAIT, 1995), which gives the promotion