

developed any measures dedicated solely to its verification role in the NWFZs. Moreover, none of the NWFZs have seen their special inspections provisions tested so far.

5. Proposals for NWFZs in South Asia, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and Central and Eastern Europe have encountered significant difficulties which are not likely to be overcome in the foreseeable future. On-going regional rivalries and external ties in some cases add to the complexities involved.

6. NWFZs are often said to contribute to global non-proliferation efforts by:

- (1) providing concrete evidence that the participating states are fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the NPT as well as their commitment to denuclearization made at the time of the indefinite extension of the NPT;
- (2) complementing the NPT by including in their fold countries which are non-parties to the NPT;
- (3) inhibiting states from pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons in response to future security needs;
- (4) providing valuable supplements to the NPT's verification structure and the IAEA safeguards system by demanding more extensive reporting by states and providing more elaborate and intrusive inspection measures than the NPT;
- (5) providing a useful and convenient diplomatic framework for threshold nuclear states to give up their nuclear option;
- (6) satisfying, by providing negative security assurances, a long-standing demand of non-nuclear weapon states regarding the threat to their national security posed by the existence of nuclear weapons; and
- (7) enabling states to concentrate on other non-proliferation issues including the creation of more comprehensive regional arms control and non-proliferation regimes such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) free zones.