

developed and that they can be implemented successfully. We also know that quite profound changes in the perception of the security environment appear to have occurred at approximately the same time. These connections cry out for careful study.

After all, if we don't know how we reached the current state of transformed relations in Europe, then we are unlikely to know how to maintain and improve them. This is a very important point. As if to underline this concern, we are already seeing disturbing indications of our inability to sustain and nurture transformation processes begun in Europe only a few years ago.

At least as significant, without a sound causal understanding of the transformation process apparently tied to the operation of successful confidence building, we will have no idea how to transfer the generalized experience of Europe to other parts of the world and to other types of security relationships. This is also a very important point, particularly as other regions approach the threshold of significant security breakthroughs of their own. The general "exportability" of Vienna Document² style CBMs and the broader CSCE/OSCE model ought not to be assumed *a priori* regardless of our enthusiasm for the approach. Unfortunately, it appears that simple exportability often is treated as a given despite rhetoric to the contrary. This may lead to significant disappointments — and possibly much worse. The misapplication of the confidence building approach in new contexts risks either retarding incipient improvements or inadvertently worsening a problematic security relationship.

Conclusion

The study of confidence building is far from complete. The author's first examination undertaken twelve years ago uncovered some weaknesses in then-contemporary thinking but failed to grasp the significance of other problems. It also proposed some tentative conceptual ideas and an analytic approach intended to help clarify our understanding of the phenomenon. Since then, much has happened and confidence building has

emerged looking like a surprisingly powerful security management approach. However, much remains unclear about how the process of confidence building actually functions and what role it plays in changing the way people think about each other and the threats that they pose.

The principal findings of *Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View* reinforce the need to understand how the exploration, negotiation, and implementation of confidence building arrangements can contribute to a process of change in the conceptualization of security relations and the institutionalization of those changes. The fact that our current confidence building thinking is the largely atheoretical product of a particular political, military, and cultural context — thus, possibly the product of a unique set of circumstances — reinforces the need to develop in a very deliberate manner as general and abstract an understanding of the phenomenon as we can manage. This review attempts to move that undertaking several steps forward.

ENDNOTES

1. James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, No. 1. Prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 1985. Although published in 1985, the study was prepared in 1984.
2. *Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*, Vienna: 1994.