

Recent Trends

- There has been growing involvement of the UN in **civil conflict**, for example in El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. Internal strife currently accounts for the most murderous conflicts afflicting the globe. UN intervention in such conflict is prompted by the unwillingness of international opinion to tolerate the loss of civilians lives on a massive scale. On the basis of a case-by-case approach, resistance in practice within the Council to UN involvement in internal strife has diminished. Sovereignty has eroded to some extent.⁴
- UN operations are increasingly deployed in support of **complex mandates** involving such goals as the monitoring and training of police, human rights work, de-mining, economic rehabilitation and a variety of forms of humanitarian assistance, many targeted at refugees. Such operations call not only for military staff but also for highly qualified civilian expertise. They are much more challenging to run and thus require a greater degree of political guidance from the Council and direction from UN headquarters than had more "traditional" PKOs.
- Following the success of Operation Desert Storm, the Council has made much greater use of the **Chapter VII** provisions of the Charter.⁵ This has involved more frequent resort to **sanctions**.⁶ The Council has also more often authorized the **use of force**.⁷ The Council

⁴ In spite of Charter provisions prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of member States, the Security Council had in earlier decades allowed the UN to become involved in such domestic conflicts as those in the Congo and in Cyprus, the claim being made that these situations threatened international peace and security. Thus, it is not the UN's involvement in inter-communal conflicts that is new, but rather its growing focus on them.

⁵ The use of force for self-defence by UN peacekeepers does not require a Chapter VII mandate. Missions established under Chapter VI of the Charter operate under rules of engagement in which self-defence is defined as including resistance to forceful attempts to prevent them from discharging their mandate. In practice, however, force commanders have been extremely reluctant to use force except in the most extreme circumstances.

⁶ Until 1990, mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII had been invoked by the Council only against the Government of Southern Rhodesia (through SCR 232 of December 16, 1966; SCR 253 of May 29, 1968; SCR 388 of April 6, 1976; and SCR 409 of May 27, 1977). As of 1990, the Council imposed mandatory sanctions against Iraq (SCR 661 of August 6, 1990, tightened through SCR 670 of September 25, 1990, modified by SCR 687 of April 3, 1991, SCR 706 of August 15, 1991, and SCR 778 of October 2, 1992); Yugoslavia (SCR 713 of September 25, 1991, SCR 757 of May 30, 1992 applicable to Serbia and Montenegro; SCR 787 of November 16, 1992, applicable to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia; SCR 820 of April 17, 1993 also applicable to the FRY); Libya (SCR 748 of March 31, 1992 and SCR 883 of November 11, 1993); Haiti (SCR 841 of June 16, 1993, suspended through SCR 861 of August 27, 1993, reimposed through SCR 873 of October 13, 1993 with accompanying enforcement measures - essentially a naval blockade - through SCR 875 of October 16, 1993); and UNITA in Angola (through SCR 864 of September 15, 1993); thus, it is clear that the UN's new activism