

I Purpose and Scope of the Study

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The long winter of the Cold War has been followed by the spring of our discontent. The threat of 45 years has been replaced by a variety of threats. Affirmations of the triumph of freedom—the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the break-up of the former Soviet Union (FSU)—have no metamorphic equivalents in the new disorderly world of the mid-1990s.

Positive actions can be counted, of course: progress, however occasionally stalled, toward constitutional government and economic reform in the republics of the FSU; a cautious, but hopeful Middle East peace process; modest confidence-building measures in place at points on the India-Pakistan border; the rolling back of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa, Argentina and Brazil. But these positive steps can be countered by the nightmare of North Korea's nuclear ambitions; the reality of millions of land mines maiming and killing civilians throughout the world; a growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their advanced delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons; and a growing set of interstate and intrastate conflicts in which violence seems to be the first rather than the last resort.

Without question, the international security environment has changed since the late 1980s. Two wars, the Cold War and the War in the Gulf, have ended. East-West conflict no longer dominates the stage, and new players, such as China, are on the scene. The focus in arms control has shifted to multilateralism, for example, negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Next on the agenda will be additional multiparty agreements and actions that contend with global and regional proliferation and address long-standing regional instabilities, which are only exacerbated by the acquisition of weapons and delivery systems. In this postwar world, the processes of arms control verification, confidence-building measures and peace operations will play major roles.

The nature and scope of arms control verification, confidence-building measures and peace operations have been examined before; however, these analyses have viewed the processes independently, or at most have looked at the linkage between arms control verification and confidence-building measures. In fact, the three share a basic underlying mission, a means of accomplishing this mission and a common operating principle: to enhance stability by collecting, processing and disseminating information in a cost-effective manner. They promote increased transparency regarding security-related matters. All three processes must adapt to a significantly changed international environment.

Since the early 1970s, arms control verification has been in an evolutionary process, proceeding from theory to practice, from unilateral space surveillance to co-operative monitoring, from Cold Warrior jousting to multiparty agreements. Along the way, on occasion the pendulum swung too far: insistence on on-site inspections at a time when the Soviet Union remained resolutely closed led to stalled negotiations; on-site inspections taken to their ultimate intrusiveness produced unexpected costs such as potential loss of sensitive information and budgetary excesses. Recently negotiated co-operative monitoring opportunities, such as the overhead surveillance called for in the Open Skies Treaty, will, in the long term, reduce the costs while serving the goal of openness and more effective verification.

Taken to the ultimate limits of its definition, confidence-building has been around since the beginning of history. The formal beginning of the diplomatic process known as Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) dates from the Helsinki Accord of 1975. While tracing CBMs from Helsinki to Vienna is useful, it narrows the geographical boundaries to Europe. What past experiences in the Sinai Disengagement Agreements demonstrate and future agreements

