

course in economic development, and their professors were relying heavily on UNCTAD.

"For its part, UNIDO ran into difficulties when it moved from doing research into becoming operational. Many of the industries it helped had counterparts in the north, so there were problems over trade competition and cheap labour. But its programs were quite successful, for example, in North African countries—Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia—in terms of advising on industrial policies; also in the East African Community, before it broke up. In the late 1960s, developing countries saw industrialization as the golden road to Utopia; so there was political pressure to get industrialized.

"I was a bureaucrat in UNIDO, being in charge of recruitment; but in that job you learn about programs and policies. Then in October 1985, I was back in Vienna helping UNIDO in the process of converting into a specialized agency. Originally, it was an autonomous department of the United Nations, directly linked to the General Assembly. UNIDO's budget amounted to about 10 per cent of the central UN budget, and it never had cash problems. Now it will be funded on its own, following the UN scale of assessments.

"I am afraid the timing of this conversion is very unfortunate. If UNIDO had become a specialized agency at the time of the 1974 Lima conference, when it was first proposed, it would have been different. But to stand on one's own, at a time when there have been giant steps back from multilateralism, is going to be difficult. When Gamani Corea was secretary-general of UNCTAD, we used to discuss seeking more autonomy for UNCTAD in some administrative matters, but he would always add: 'I don't want any part of becoming a specialized agency. UNCTAD needs the political power of the General Assembly.'

"We are talking about comparatively small sums. UNIDO's whole budget for a year doesn't represent, in dollars, a respectable addition to a GM factory. This money, therefore, has in some way to be serving a catalytic or demonstration effect. The main strength comes from the political 'oomph' behind the money. UNIDO is a good organization, and the Austrians have built a beautiful headquarters for it. UNIDO could do a lot—but where will it be without that tie to the General Assembly?"

Of UNRWA and UNEP, Foran says: "They were the best experiences I had. They were both so small that you learn[ed] everything." During his time with UNEP, there were only 90 professional staff.

Regarding the financial crisis, there were, in early 1986, high-level discussions with the United States Government, aimed at bringing home to Washington the consequences of allowing the Kassebaum Amendment and the Gramm-Rudman Act to take effect. But, as for the hope that this could lead to a change of view, Foran said: "I think it's too late for that."

Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas sponsored an amendment that would cut the U.S. contribution to the UN regular budget from 25 per cent to 20 per cent of the total. (In 1945, the United States was paying 40 per cent.) The cut could be waived if Secretary of State George Shultz could certify that the UN had adopted a system of weighted voting on budget matters ("grant to each member state voting rights on matters of budgetary consequence