

on village ovens for baking bread. As all property taken for the use of the troops, or destroyed on advance of the enemy, was to be paid for by the Government, at fair rates, it would have been better, on both counts, to have made depots of live and dead stock at central points on declaration of war, and to have fed the forces from them, replenishing them from the coast. We shall see further on Napoleon's opinion as to false economy on this head.

Depots of Military Stores. At the central points do not appear to have been sufficiently attended to; the arsenals and fortresses were depended on for these articles. But these places would have quite enough to do in issuing stores in bulk, without having to deal with troops in detail. And if the formation of such temporary depots is left to the time of imminent danger, there will be the confusion and waste such as has happened on more than one occasion since these days. The first thing Napoleon began with was the depots for artillery and military stores.

Corps of local Pioneers were established all round the coast; and the correspondence shows how much impressed the Commander-in-Chief and his generals were with the importance of such local bodies, for assisting in forming intrenchments, in making and destroying roads and bridges, inundating marshes, &c. The Railway Engineer Corps was intended partly to supply this want at the present day; but however valuable and indispensable such a corps would be for special works, it is to the local corps of Volunteer Engineers we must look for the chief assistance in this respect. But if these corps are to take the place of those pioneers, who were so much in demand in 1803, they should be practised in their own localities on the description of work they will have to do, and not treated as ordinary infantry volunteers.

Remarks.

The whole of this part of the story may be in effect summed up in these words: "*Great Britain declared war first, and then began to think about preparing for it afterwards.*" Nothing was done the last time she was done so; the old story was precisely repeated over again in 1854. There was plenty of energy in 1803 when they did begin to prepare, no lack of war enthusiasm everywhere, but the alarming feature of it all, the terrible tone that pervaded it throughout, was that it had to be done as it were under fire in the presence of the enemy. While Napoleon's single genius was rapidly arranging his forces for action, the British war authorities were still discussing what system of defence they should make, and the British Parliament was fighting about the general principles on which the forces should be recruited. It was not the want of warlike spirit; there were 7 or 800,000 men under arms, almost every man of whom had enlisted of his own free will; but not one quarter of them knew anything of drill or discipline. And nothing had been settled as to the positions they were to occupy or how they were to get there, or how to be provisioned when they got there; no defences had been prepared, no guns mounted. When Napoleon calculated on the disaffection of a large portion of the English people to their constitution he showed how little a foreigner, even of the highest intelligence, understands our national character; but when he prophesied the indecision and confusion of the British Government, he laid bare the weak point of the country, of which future enemies may all take advantage.

For the indecision as to our war policy exists still and therefore the confusion that will arise on a declaration of war may be confidently foretold. We have been told lately by a high political authority that the old maxim, *si vis pacem para bellum*, is now to be interpreted, "If you wish for peace, prepare for peace." If that means that you are to make no preparation for war whatever, then that was exactly what happened in 1793 and 1803, with a result each time not encouraging to that interpretation. But if it means that you are to make every requisite preparation to defend yourself when and wherever you are attacked, then that is exactly the interpretation I should wish the British Government to give to the old Latin proverb.

We are not so prepared at present. Our present condition, from a war point of view, as compared with 1803, may be generally stated thus: our external cares and liabilities have multiplied manifold; we have more dependencies to look after, more ocean wealth exposed to attack, very much greater dependency on foreign food and we are more liable to invasion. These are all against us. On the other hand, we have double the population, with probably double the wealth per head, and improved weapons to defend ourselves with. Upon the whole, it must be allowed that our general condition is less secure from vital injury by an enemy than in 1803; and an evidence of it appears in the successive panics that come over the country upon every threat of war. Well did the Duke of York demonstrate this when he said of the state of affairs in 1803: "A panic generally arises from a danger which has not been foreseen. A high spirited people never despond when they feel themselves possessed of the means of resistance." If this view our position is correct, as I think it could be shown to be by details, our preparations for securing our position ought to be so much the more carefully made beforehand.

Our Present Land Forces.

Now, in the first place, what land forces have we actually available? The whole of our peace establishment of all ranks and all kinds, and to defend all parts of our empire, is, according to the Statesman's Year Book of 1875, and about 500,000. This number, in proportion to population, is about one-third of the maximum number of all sorts raised to defend our then empire during the war of the French Revolution. Where are the other two thirds to come from in case of war? Recollect, we are in a worse general position as regards an enemy than at that time; we therefore cannot do with less than the same proportion of land forces in war. Indeed, when we consider the character of the change in our position, that a material part of it consists in more distant and extended responsibilities over the world, we must expect to require a greater proportion to population than was required in 1805. Then, again, consider the character of the forces. About 100,000 out of the 500,000 are regular troops, belonging to the Queen's permanent Army, better drilled, better disciplined, and better conditioned altogether than that were called Regulars in 1805. We have, therefore as regards the regular troops, an advantage in quality, and not so great a disproportion in quantity. But there is another standard for armies to be considered besides population, and that is the force the enemy is most likely to bring against you; and it will be found, on consideration of the present standing armies of Europe, as compared with those of the Great Napoleon's days,

that they have not only doubled in strength, and have also improved in drill and discipline, but that far more effective and sure means are now taken to increase those numbers of trained troops rapidly and largely in war.

What measures have we now for increasing rapidly and largely those 200,000 regulars? I don't think it is putting the case too strongly to say, that we have absolutely none worth mentioning. There is a so-called Army Reserve. I wish to speak with respect of the attempts by Lord Cardwell to improve our Army; there are two of his measures which bear upon this part of my subject—the Army Reserve and the Localization. But when one hears of 30,000 as a high result anticipated from the first, one is reminded of a former Army Reserve in 1803, of which Mr. Windham said, in 1806, that it was "like a turnpike gate which men were paid to go through, and no more made an army than the lobby of the House of Commons made the members." "It was like Harquins's horse," the only fault of which was that he was dead." The same epitaph, I fear would go for both reserves: "*Quiescit in pace et non in bello resurgit.*" Now, bearing in mind that it was "trained soldiers" that were in demand in 1803, not recruits, not militia, not volunteers; that the question as put to Parliament even in 1806, and by a Whig Minister, was: "How are we to ensure to this country what unquestionably it has never had, a never failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers?" I think we shall not be going beyond the mark, in 1876, in putting the requisite reserve of the regular army at nearer three hundred thousand than thirty. And at the back of these should be the militia and the volunteers; not a militia which has the distinction of regulars without the training; not Volunteers which, as was said of those of 1803, "were as much an army as a man's picture is himself;" but which shall both of them together form the old constitutional force, the armed people of England, prepared, as Pitt said of them "to fight on their own soil for everything dear to the individual and important to the State." These men would form the garrison of England, while the regulars formed the moving army. No amount of ironclads could in these days give the same strength to the defenders, and hesitation to the enemy, as the knowledge that two such bodies could be called into existence at a few days' warning.

Preparations for Mobilization.

That is one preparation required. Another which, like the former, can only be properly done in time of peace, consists in the arrangements for concentrating all the forces when raised, at suitable places in the country selected beforehand, for collecting the necessary war stores and provisions at these places, for constructing field works in positions carefully planned before, for taking possession of certain railways and telegraphs and occupying certain lands, so that on declaration of war, all these questions will not have to be discussed by Committees at the War Office, as in 1803, but that, that declaration, *ipso facto*, will be the authority for Generals of districts, in concert with Lords Lieutenant of counties, to proceed at once to carry out the plans lying already drawn up in detail in their offices. We know that a great deal has been all ready done, and is going, towards this essential preparation, especially in the lately created Intelligence Department of the War Office, which has at once shown its value by commencing to perform that important service