

leave it for a trifle and those who would go rather than put in 12 days' drill must be our enemies and I would say we were well rid of them—as an enemy in the camp is worse than ten out of it.

With respect to the time—I consider 12 days too short—as the idea of giving new recruits one or two days squad drill without arms and then giving them arms, is opposed to all my notions of military training. 20 days is the very shortest time that men should be drilled in camp, as at 12 days they have just begun to get used to it and learnt something.

But considering the chance they have—to use the words of an intelligent American officer—"It is really surprising the proficiency they do attain"—and this brings me to the question—Which is the most advantageous method of utilizing the time when in camp?—and without pretending to be an authority, I give my opinion for what it is worth—having been 11 years a volunteer, seen a little service and filled every position from a full private in the rear rank to that of captain of as good a company of volunteers as ever I saw. And with considerable pride I point to their record in the Report on the State of the Militia for last year, they having made the highest company average score in the Dominion for the number of shots fired, and one member having made the highest individual score in any brigade or division where the same number of rounds were fired. Several of the other brigades fired 20 rounds and we had but 15, and not very favourable weather for our firing.

My opinion is this—instead of wasting four-fifths of our time in elaborate company battalion and brigade movements—(particularly marching past—which is very hard for recruits to do and is only intended for display and will do very well for large and standing armies which are perfect in their other branches) let the men be well grounded in company drill and then thoroughly instructed and perfected in the use of the rifle and skirmishing—as it is on the accuracy of our rifle practice we would have to depend in case of a war breaking out—which I hope may be long deferred. But the soldier-like proverb handed down to us—"In time of peace, prepare for war" holds good here as well as elsewhere, and in the event of a war—so can it be with. Either with the Americans, the Indians, or, as the Hon. Mr. Huntington says) a religious war. If with the Americans—we will have to depend on the rifle and act as a continual line of skirmishers, as we could not reasonably expect to stand one general engagement with such a difference in numbers—the Americans being 10 times as numerous as we are. But any military authority will admit that one skirmisher (particularly when fighting for his own home and fireside and on his own soil) is equal to ten men marching in a body in an enemy's country; and with the present destructive weapons, the mark-

manship of our Canadian militia, the knowledge that the Americans could not send all their army here, and their being hampered with their commissary department—the difference between us dwindles down until our prospects are very much better than most people would imagine. With some it has been a common remark—"The Americans could take Canada in a week!"—but with the example of the Americans themselves before their eyes—such people must be very foolish. Did not they gain their Independence from a country twelve times stronger than they were, and an Army which was never beaten before—and what was the reason? The Americans were acting as skirmishers, firing from behind stumps and fences (themselves covered) on an enemy—who though brave as lions were in the open ground and the attacking party—and in case of war—it is very certain we should not be the attacking party, and therefore we should be placed in exactly the same position that the Americans occupied in their struggle for independence; and I trust and believe with the same result. And are we not fully as good men as they? Are we not as good marksmen? Aye, and better. For an answer to the first question—we have only to refer to the words of General Sheridan, and there are several Kingston boys who heard him use them—"The Canadians in my army are the hardest, toughest, and bravest men I have got," and the reason is we have a climate that makes us hardy—and we are the sons of toil and are used to hard work and such men are vastly superior to the effeminate of large cities. In reply to the 2nd question, let us look at the returns of the practice of our Wimbledon team and the practice at Creedmoor; and at the returns of the American regular army and our volunteer army, and then hold up our heads proudly.

Then is it not foolish to be teaching men that which they will never use and neglecting that which they will possibly stand some day in urgent need of.

If the Indians should ever be our enemies—which is not likely—I would ask any one who has ever read of an Indian fight whether it was a general engagement or fought from behind trees and horses backs, and they will answer the question themselves.

As to the religious war—I think that will only be fought in the brain of the honorable gentleman who spoke of it. The only foes we are likely to meet are the Fenians or some such rascallions, and as long as we keep up some sort of a force, they will not be likely to trouble us much—as they have not yet forgotten Pigeon Hill and the brave O'Neil (save the mark). At the same time, I believe that if we were totally unarmed and helpless, from the facilities the American Frontier affords—there would be numerous filibustering expeditions projected and carried into our country by lawless bands intent only on rapine and plunder—

but the knowledge that we were prepared would have the effect of retarding all such. Now in order to keep up some sort of force—the rank and file must be paid more—as to the regimental officers—they do not expect to come out clear, so it does not matter about them as they have something to work for—viz: promotion—but the men have not as a general rule any great wish for that and therefore must be satisfied in some other way, and what other way is there but to pay them more, and also have all classes respect them and make it an honor to belong to the Volunteer Force; remembering that

A soldier you should not offend—
Nor treat him as a stranger—
For you know he is your country's friend—
In the hour of toil and danger.

Now a part of the money that goes to the staff might very well be spared and added to the pay of the men as there are several staff appointments which are simply sinecures, and therefore should be done away with. Leave every rank open to the volunteer force and do not fill it with place-men—political friends or old regular officers, and you will have plenty of smart, intelligent officers join—who will endure the trouble and annoyance of keeping up a company in the face of all obstacles—but if you do not leave some incentive, smart pushing men will seek some other profession. And now I will explain what it is that prompted me to take up the pen in defence of the sword—it is this—in September last I made application for some ammunition through the proper authorities, in order to hold a company match and to keep up the "esprit de corps" amongst the men; and as the government would not give any prize, I and my brother officers made up a purse for the men and arranged a day to hold the match—never apprehending any difficulty about getting ammunition.

Not receiving any reply to my requisition, I endeavoured to get some from the officers of some other company or battalion—but I could not get a single round as there were none to be had. (What would we do in case of a sudden necessity for some?)

Twice I renewed my application and the Lieut. Colonel in command of the battalion wrote frequently about it and at length I received through him a reply from the Adjutant General—stating that clauses 171 of the Order and Regulations of the Militia is amended by General Order of the 23rd April, which restricts the number of rounds to 15—and yet the 1st and 2nd divisions and many others had 20 rounds served—and the brigades of which went into camp on the 7th of September. Now there is something wrong about this—if one battalion can have 20 and others are restricted to 15; and speaking for myself, I can only say that if it is done to save money by the government, it is a very cent wise and dollar-foolish thing to do, as the men should be very carefully taught the way in which to fire, and