

recognized that U.S. sensitivity will make it necessary to retain actual control of planning for continental defence in North American hands.

24. In practice the only real co-ordination and balancing of priorities as between the defence of Europe and the defence of North America that is now being carried out is being done on a purely national basis, as for instance in Washington. As far as we can judge, present United States policy in this respect is to continue to develop their nuclear deterrent power, to maintain substantially their present forces in Europe, to scale down where possible commitments in other parts of the world (e.g. in Korea) and to build up in North America a strategic mobile reserve and continental air defences against the Soviet nuclear threat. The NATO sector of this policy was defined in a declaration by the United States President, in which he confirmed that, when the Paris Agreements came into force, it would be United States policy "to continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and to continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defence of this area".

25. Related to this question of co-ordination of defence planning is the question of measures to strengthen the unity of the coalition, to which reference was made earlier. If our allies are to appreciate the importance of North American defence as part of the defence of the NATO area, it is surely necessary that it should be a subject of multilateral concern and not exclusively of bilateral consultation. Moreover, the maintenance of Canadian and United States forces in Europe should be recognized as a question of concern to NATO as a whole and not merely of individual national concern. The presence of these forces in Europe has an important political effect, as a token of trans-Atlantic solidarity, in addition to its military effect, and any substantial withdrawal might seriously affect the unity of the alliance. Any withdrawals which might become necessary for the purpose of North American defence, therefore, must not only be in the interest of NATO as a whole but must be seen by our allies as such. This factor is likely to be of particular importance if, as may be expected, the Communist side puts increasing emphasis on measures short of military aggression to weaken the West and especially to isolate North America from its European allies.

Continental Defence

26. The prevention of war, except in the defence of vital interests, is the main aim of Canadian national policy as it is of our allies. A strategy designed to achieve this objective therefore is of prime importance to Canadian national interests. Canada's geographical location, between the USA and USSR and athwart the trans-polar routes, puts Canada in a position to contribute to the nuclear deterrent power of the allies in two ways: by the provision of facilities on or over Canadian territory and through continental defence. For it must be assumed that in any future war, the Soviet Government would realize that their primary aim of defeating the Western Coalition could best be served by placing the emphasis on directing nuclear air strikes on North America in order to destroy SAC bases and the centres of war-making capacity, the weight of which, if left untouched, would be brought to bear against the Soviet Union with disastrous effect. Air nuclear attack against North America would probably be the most important element of Soviet strategy since the neglect of this element more than any other would clearly be disastrous to the Soviet Union.

27. Continental defence thus involves the protection of the population and other resources of North America, upon which the ability of Canada and the United States — and indeed of the Western Coalition — to sustain a war in the long run depends. It also