

examine the events which had been occurring in Syria and possibly take action to counteract them. Some of the Arab friends of the West were much more outspokenly critical than their neutralist colleagues, in particular Dr. Fawzi, whose remarks about Great Power manoeuvring in the Middle East had a double edge.

3. The Western Powers also suffered disabilities resulting from the Anglo-French armed intervention in the Middle East in 1956. During the Twelfth Session there was remarkably little criticism of either the United Kingdom or France, from the Arabs or from any other quarter than the Soviet bloc, but the Delegations of France and the United Kingdom seemed inhibited by the events which had dominated the Eleventh Session and therefore shrank from taking initiatives at the Twelfth. In addition, the French were almost exclusively preoccupied with the Algerian question and the United Kingdom Delegation, although at first not too concerned about Cyprus, seemed paralyzed by their anxiety about possible items concerning Oman, Aden and other situations with a colonial tinge. The net result was that none of the Great Powers of the West were confidently disposed to take a strong lead at the Twelfth Session, but particularly in the political committees. However, the United States Delegates (Congressman Judd) in the Second Committee and the United Kingdom Delegate (Sir Andrew Cohen) in the Fourth Committee turned in creditable performances.

4. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was in a strong position to dominate the Assembly. The potentialities of sputnik diplomacy were considerable and at first the Soviet Delegation showed every sign of exploiting them skilfully. Mr. Gromyko's statement in the general debate was generally regarded as one of the best ever made in the Assembly by a Soviet spokesman. It reflected wisdom, moderation and confidence. However, in the discussion of what were perhaps the two most important political items — disarmament and the Syrian situation — the Soviet Delegation resorted to a brand of toughness which was quite out of keeping with Soviet policies at the Assembly during the past four years. While there was some nervousness on the part of some delegates like those from Poland, Yugoslavia and Indonesia, the main reaction of important neutralists, like the Indians and Egyptians, was to deplore Soviet attempts to bully the Assembly. This reaction against the Soviet Union, and particularly during the consideration of the Syrian item, came to be shared by almost all segments of opinion in the Assembly. This was followed by a noticeable softening, or perhaps indifference, in the Soviet line. Soviet criticism of Western Powers during the discussion of such items as the financing of UNEF, Algeria and Cyprus was almost perfunctory in comparison with earlier sessions. The turning point in the Soviet attitude seemed to coincide with the ousting of Marshal Zhukov. Viewed from New York, however, the softening in the Soviet attitude was an apparent result from the realization that the policy of harshness had served to reduce the benefit reaped by the Soviet Union from its scientific achievements.

5. A by-product of the Soviet attitude was that the satellite delegations tended to assume the initiative for the Soviet bloc. This was particularly noticeable in the Special Committee and in the Second and Third Committees, where the Delegations of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania were active. Moreover, the Polish position in the principal political bodies, the Plenary Session and the First Committee, continued to show variation from the main Soviet theme. There were signs, but particularly after the reaction against the bullying tactics of the Soviet Union, that the satellite delegations had stepped up their efforts to communicate with and influence uncommitted countries not only from Africa and Asia but including less dependable Latin American allies of the West like El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti. So it developed at the Twelfth Session that many of the initiatives by the Soviet