

the people have been deceived by the *sophisms* and false pretensions of the cabinet, to examine this subject, and to attend to the essays of any man who will devote his time and whatever talents he may possess to this arduous duty.

The second circumstance worthy of consideration is this, that it is impossible to discuss and to prove, the insincerity of the offers made by our own cabinet without *indirectly justifying* the British cabinet in rejecting them. Hence it may be expected that the old clamour, of supporting the pretensions of our enemy will be revived, and if we were to utter these sentiments in Baltimore we might be exposed to martyrdom and massacre. We simply however present to all tender consciences this plain apology.—Whether our rulers have sincerely and honestly solicited and sought for peace is an important question. *If they have, all opposition ought to be withdrawn, and we should unite in their favour.* If they have not; but if in place of it, they have endeavoured to deceive the people by insincere professions of peace, *they merit our highest censure and indignation.*

I cannot perceive how this question can be in any manner discussed without involving in it, either a *censure* or an *approbation* of the British government in rejecting the overtures. If any man can see a middle course let him take it.

For ourselves, conscious of as much patriotism as Mr. Madison *pretends to*, and seeing no reason, as he does, for covering up our thoughts, in dark, ambiguous, unintelligible language, we shall proceed boldly to shew that his late extraordinary proposals for an *armistice* were unreasonable, hostile, and calculated to produce everything but peace.

Having already extended the necessary preliminary observations to so great a length; the limits of a newspaper essay will only permit us to make these important introductory remarks on the subject of the late extraordinary and unreasonable propositions for an *armistice*.

The first is, that it is, we believe, the first time, in the history of nations, that a proposal for an *armistice* was made by the party declaring an *offensive war*, before he had struck a single blow upon the enemy;—before he had gained or was likely to gain a single advantage. If we should put this measure into a simple form, we should say, that it was in the nature of a menace—"There, Sir, you have failed to yield to our threats, because you thought we did not dare to make war, we now shew you that we have courage, therefore yield." Is this a natural and usual mode of conciliating an enemy, and of reconciling him to terms, which he had before rejected?

A brave and powerful nation would have preferred to have shewn its prowess—to have wrested something from its enemy which it could offer, as the equivalent for concession.

The second remark which occurs to us, without entering at large into the terms proposed, is that we offer to Great-Britain precisely the same terms which were offered by Mr. Monroe, in 1807.—We offer to exclude British seamen from our publick and pri-