

impressions gathered in the British occupied territory, where I was attached to the Military Governor's staff during December, 1918, and January, 1919.

From what we saw of that part of France, which has been occupied by the Germans during the war and from our experiences in Cologne there emerge two clear and definite impressions. First, that the German in arms is a very different creature from the German in civilian life. The German General Staff had drawn up a very definite programme by which to impose themselves upon the world. In that programme the terrorizing of the civilian populations of many countries and of invaded territories held an important place. Most of the acts of frightfulness were performed under higher orders, with a definite aim in view, and in the German soldier, they had an obedient and well disciplined tool. Had the German staff estimated more justly the effect of their frightfulness on men of independent temper and strong purpose, had they judged more accurately the psychologies of the peoples arrayed against them, the programme of frightfulness would never have been carried out, for it would have been recognized as being useless.

Secondly, in excuse for the war, which educated Germans now acknowledge to have been a war of aggression, the Germans only offer the very childish excuse: "We were deceived". Deceived, they mean, by the high civilian and military authorities. That they were led into the war under the delusion that their own existence was threatened, and that the path to illimitable glory and prestige was also the only path to self-preservation. And in very artless and naïve fashion, they assume that since they, the German people, were deceived as much as we, the Allies, therefore we ought to forgive and forget; a view, which casts reflection on either their sanity or their honesty.

Our stay after the armistice in the part of France which, during the war, had been behind the German lines, was too short and our moves too frequent for us to get to know the French civilian population intimately, and, consequently, we missed hearing a good many interesting things concerning the German occupation. Just before the Armistice, during the advance, we halted for a few days at a place called Attiches, south of Lille. The parish priest, a tall, fine-looking man and splendid company, a typical *méridionale*, dined with us one night and among other things told us the following interesting piece of information. It appears that during the battle of Loos in 1915, the headquarters of the German Army holding the Vimy-Loos-La Bassée front was at Attiches, and so apprehensive were the Germans during the first days of the battle of Loos, that the Headquarters was packed up, automobiles and lorries waiting in the street, all ready to move back at ten minute's notice, should the British effect a break-through. After the first day or so, however, this state of "Stand-to" was dropped. They realized that we had missed our chance. This confirms what was thought in 1915 by some of our experts, that Loos might very easily have been a tremendous success for the Allies, had they thrown in more divisions with greater speed.

The country into which we advanced November, 1918, had been entirely denuded by the Germans of all live stock. In all the broad fields not a single living thing was to be seen. For months before the Armistice the Germans had been driving cattle back into Germany, for the most part by road. Even during the war German cattle-dealers used to arrive in the occupied territory, mark down a certain number of cattle on each farm, and have them sent to Germany. Even the poultry were taken. The French people told us that during the war the Germans had