

or to be less than twelve, of whom six shall change with the secretary of state (on constitutional grounds) and six shall hold office *quam diu se bene gesserint*, with two assistant permanent under-secretaries for the respective departments of the colonies in the eastern and western hemisphere. This exposition will, it is to be hoped, sufficiently explain and justify the petition to Parliament, which is totally unconnected with party or personal considerations, and seeks to aid rather than embarrass government.

“The inhabitants of the different colonies, and all who are interested in this vital subject, are requested to use every lawful effort in support of a Parliamentary enquiry, as there are great difficulties to be overcome before a just colonial government can be formed.”

The question of remedy is the great question. And here the suggestions of Mr. Martin are surely insufficient. An “administrative board,” such as he proposes, is, on many accounts, objectionable. The number, “twelve,” is too small, if it be intended to secure to the department on all colonial questions the advice of persons practically acquainted with every colony. It would scarcely be easy to select twelve men, who could advise, from their own practical knowledge, on all occasions. Again, supposing this board an “*administrative* board,” with six of its members holding office permanently, the check upon the colonial secretary would be so great as to deprive him of that power in the department, which a responsible adviser of the crown must have. How could Parliament censure a colonial minister with his hands tied by an “administrative” council, one-half of its members irremovable, and the other half removable only by his own resignation of office? The head of a department must be responsible. To be responsible, he must have power. To suppose that either a board of twelve persons, half of them holding office for life, or a colonial secretary shackled by