

A *third* reason for the lack of confirmed data is conflicting interpretations of *whether* or not a transfer has occurred. Several examples from the first year of reporting make the point. Several states reported receiving ships from the United States, ships that were in fact leased. U.S. national procedures do not define these transfers as a change in control or ownership of the ships and therefore did not report them. A further case of confusion occurred in Europe with co-produced MLRS systems. Some members of the consortium reported them as production, others as transfers.

A *fourth* reason for the lack of confirmed data was conflicting interpretations of *when* a transfer occurred. In the case of a submarine sold by Germany to the Republic of Korea in 1992, Germany reported the export since ownership was assumed by the ROK in 1992. The ROK, however, apparently interpreted a transfer as occurring when the ship was actually under their national control, which they concluded occurred in 1993, and therefore did not report the import of the submarine. A second example occurred between China and Pakistan, who both reported a transfer of tanks from China but differed in the numbers based on differing interpretations as to when Pakistan assumed control of the equipment.

A *fifth* source of lower quality data is the lack of confirmed and transparent data due to a poorly defined category, namely Category Seven — missiles and missile launchers. Some states used highly aggregated data in this category, e.g., 109 missiles and missile launchers exported from Country A to Country B. If the 'Remarks' column did not break these data out by type and/or model of missile, or disaggregate into missiles and launchers, in effect it produced little or no information on the actual transfers which occurred. While this complies with the procedures outlined in the Report of the 1992 Panel of Governmental Technical Experts (Document A/47/342), it violates the basic purpose of the Register. In this case the results may be more dysfunctional than non participation or non reporting since its may add to misperceptions. Since this was a common occurrence and is ripe for a solution in the current deliberations of the 1994 Group, it is useful to suggest several reasons for this behaviour and lack of motivation by states to be transparent about their missile transfers. First, it must be remembered that this is a Register created by the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath. Despite the tanks and aircraft in the Iraqi arsenal, it was the missiles — air-to-air, surface-to-air, and above all surface-to-surface (e.g., modified SCUDs) which dominated the concern of the allied coalition which fought the Gulf War and the architects of the UN Register. This category, therefore, is the most sensitive since it can have the most impact on regional conflict. On the other hand, these same missiles possessed not by aggressor states but states concerned only with protecting themselves also view their inventory on missiles critical to that mission. They are expensive and as a result states safeguard them against preemptive strikes. It is not surprising, therefore, that some states would not be too enthusiastic about releasing too much information regarding models and types which could then be translated into capabilities to be countered by enemies. A broad definition of this category