

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

It might also be advisable to assess the present approach to the confidence-building measures and reaffirm the political commitment undertaken for participating in these measures. Another important responsibility of the review conference lies in strengthening the character of the convention as an instrument of non-proliferation, without of course changing the basic principles regarding commercial relations and scientific cooperation.

In the light of the fresh evidence that one of the signatories to the BWC conducted a biological warfare programme, the question of verification cannot be considered any more as only a theoretical one. On the contrary, this problem seems to be more topical than ever before. One of the most important and probably most difficult tasks ahead of the third review conference is to lay the groundwork for the further consideration of the establishment of a future verification system of the BWC.

Naturally, a relatively short conference cannot cover the whole problem of verification in its entirety and complexity. One possible solution is to concentrate our efforts on questions of principle and leave the practical details to a new follow-up process. It is evident that any kind of follow-up will have to face a laborious task, where a great deal of detailed technical work is to be accomplished. In the light of this, we think that such a process should not necessarily be tied to a rigid time frame. The primary nature of such a follow-up will probably have to be an exploratory one. We must not forget that verification of the BWC constitutes a very specific task, and it may easily turn out to be even more difficult than that of the CWC. As an introductory measure to further negotiations, possible approaches have to be defined and examined from the points of view of practicability, effectiveness and costs.

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