

## *Abstract*

With political tensions increasing throughout the world, individual states and alliances have accelerated their search for security. Traditional suspicions among nations have consequently grown. Therefore, the value of future arms control agreements will depend on their verifiability. Using the experience of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CD), this study looks at verification in a general sense and offers a framework for a conceptual approach to the issue.

## *Résumé*

L'accroissement des tensions politiques à travers le monde a amené les États, de même que les alliances, à accélérer leur recherche d'une plus grande sécurité. Conséquemment, les soupçons qu'ils entretenaient dans le passé semblent s'être aggravés. C'est pourquoi l'efficacité des accords pour le contrôle des armements dépendra en grande partie des moyens de vérification retenus. En se basant sur les résultats obtenus par le Comité des Nations Unies pour le désarmement (CD), cette étude analyse la question de la vérification d'une manière générale, et propose un cadre de travail qui développe une approche conceptuelle sur ce problème.

## *Preface*

This paper provides the conceptual foundation for an understanding of verification which can be built upon in all areas of arms control. It is the product of cooperation, over eighteen months, between the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs and the Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence. A good part of the material researched for the paper comes from ORAE Report No. R73 entitled *A Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals*, submitted simultaneously to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in June, 1980, as CD/99, and from ORAE Report No. 76 entitled *A Quantitative Working Paper on the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals*, presented in Geneva as CD/127 in July, 1980. The first edition of this Conceptual Working Paper was introduced in Geneva as CD/183 in June, 1981, as part of the ongoing study on verification being conducted in Ottawa. It was also published simultaneously by the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, as ORAE Report No. 79, dated August, 1981.

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