by-passing of the United Nations on this subject, although welcoming the approach through technical discussions; (b) and (c), items proposed by the Soviet Union on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and on the reduction of the military budgets of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10-15% and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries (agenda items 70 and 72); and (d) appointment of members of the Disarmament Commission (agenda item 19).

The debate resulted in the adoption of four resolutions: (a) a resolution co-sponsored by 17 powers (including Canada) which set forth certain aspects of the Western position, adopted by a vote of 49 in favour, 9 against with 22 abstentions; (b) an Indian-Yougoslav resolution expressing hope for agreement in the talks on surprise attack, adopted by a vote of 75 in favour, none against with 2 abstentions; (c) a resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden expressing hope for agreement in the political discussions on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, adopted by a vote of 55 in favour, 9 against with 12 abstentions; (d) an Indian-Yugoslav resolution setting up on an *ad hoc* basis for 1959 a disarmament commission of all members of the United Nations, adopted by a vote of 75 in favour, none against with 3 abstentions.

Five other draft resolutions were discussed and met varying fates: (a) a Soviet proposal for the unconditional cessation of nuclear tests was withdrawn; (b) a Soviet proposal concerning the reduction of military budgets was defeated; (c) an Arab-Asian-African proposal concerning the cessation of nuclear tests was defeated; (d) an Irish proposal to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons was withdrawn after a partial vote; and (e) a Mexican proposal for meetings of the nuclear powers with the First Committee Chairman to consider negotiating procedures was withdrawn.

The discussion in the First Committee, which took place between October 8 and November 4, was strongly affected by the imminence of the political negotiations on nuclear tests and of the technical talks on surprise attack. These two problems tended to be uppermost in the minds of most delegations, but there was a reluctance in the General Assembly to adopt recommendations which might appear to prejudge the issues. Thus, despite the pre-occupation of many delegations with nuclear tests, the Soviet Union did not succeed in marshalling support outside the Soviet bloc for its proposal for the unconditional cessation of tests.

The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed on October 20 his conviction of the inadvisability of passing a resolution on tests suspension with any support short of virtual unanimity. It was, he suggested, the Committee's duty to seek common ground in the aims expressed by each delegation, not to underline differences; there did appear to be agreement on the goal to be sought, namely, the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Mr. Smith continued by underlining the Western position that the indefinite continuation of test suspension should be conditional on progress towards general disarmament. Nuclear warfare is not an independent evil, he stated, and indeed the development and refinement of nuclear weapons had been themselves necessitated by the accumulation and threatening use of conventional armament by the Soviet Union and its allies, in the face of which the offer of the United States and the United Kingdom to suspend further testing under a separate and prior agreement was a courageous concession. But, while thus insisting on the importance of balanced disarmament, the Canadian Delegation recognized the need of proceeding by stages, and endorsed the suspension of nuclear tests as an initial measure.