

The True Witness

AND CATHOLIC CHRONICLE.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY

The True Witness Printing & Publishing Co.
(LIMITED)

At No. 781 Craig St., Montreal, Canada.

MS. and all other communications intended for publication or notice, should be addressed to the Editor, and all business and other communications to the Managing Director, TRUE WITNESS P. & P. CO., LTD., P. O. Box 1188.

The Subscription price of THE TRUE WITNESS for city, Great Britain, Ireland and France, is \$1.50.

Belgium, Italy, Germany and Australia \$2.00.
Canada, United States and Newfoundland, \$1.00.

Terms payable in advance.
New subscriptions can commence at any time during the year.

Money for renewals and new subscriptions should be sent to Managing Director, P. O. Box 1188.

You may remit by bank check, post office money order, express money order or by registered letter. Silver sent through the mail is liable to wear a hole through the envelope and be lost.

We are not responsible for money lost through the mail.

Discontinuance.—Remember that the publishers must be notified by letter when a subscriber wishes his paper stopped. All arrears must be paid.

Returning your paper will not enable us to discontinue it, as we cannot find your name on our books unless your post office address is given.

The date opposite your name on the margin of your paper shows you up to what time your subscription is paid.

We recognize the friends of THE TRUE WITNESS by the prompt manner in which they pay their subscriptions.

Always give the name of the post office to which your paper is sent. Your name cannot be found on our books unless this is done.

When you wish your address changed, write us in time, giving your old address as well as your new one.

If you fail to receive your paper regularly, notify us at once by letter or postal.

All communications for publication must be written on one side of the sheet only, otherwise they are liable to rejection.



WEDNESDAY,.....MARCH 27, 1895

INFALLIBILITY.

We have now to consider in what capacity the Pope is fallible. To do so we must note the two characters that combine in the Pope, as well as in all persons in authority, namely, his private or individual character and his public or official character. "With the Pope, in his private character—as an individual believer, private teacher, or author; as a theologian, canonist, philosopher, historian, jurist, scientist, or scholar—we have nothing to do here. As such he does not claim to be, and is not infallible." As far as the dogma is concerned the Pope's personal views in philosophy, theology, or even matters of faith, may be altogether false and untenable; in fact, they may be positively heretical. Infallibility has to do, not with what he thinks or believes, but with what he teaches for the belief of the Church.

"Canon Law," says Dr. Hettinger, "seems to admit the possibility of the Pope, as a *private individual*, falling into heresy." Pope Gregory XI. actually inserted in his will a clause retracting whatever he might have said, in speech, conversation, or writing, *contrary to the Catholic Faith*. Dr. Smith says: "According to the more probable opinion, the Pope may fall into heresy and err in matters of faith as a *private person*." The same author adds: "Yet, it is universally admitted that no Pope ever did fall into heresy even as a private person." For further confirmation of this see Cardinal Hergenrother's "Catholic Church and Christian State," vol. 1, pp. 80-81.; Cardinal Mazzella's "De Ecclesia," nn. 1045-47; Hurter's "Theologia Generalis," vol. 1, p. 124; Fessler's "True and False Infallibility," p. 75.

Rev. Daniel Lyons says, regarding the public or official capacity: "The Pope

may be considered as a simple Priest, or as the (local) Bishop of Rome, or as the Archbishop and Metropolitan of the Roman Province, or as the Primate of Italy, or as the Patriarch of the West, or, finally, as the Supreme Head of the Church—Christ's Vicar on earth; for all these titles, as well as the several offices they represent, belong to him." (See Benedict XIV., "De Synodo," C. 1, Cap. I, pp. 29, 30.) But we have nothing to do with him as Priest, Bishop, Archbishop, Metropolitan, Primate, or Patriarch—as such he is not infallible, nor does infallibility belong in any way to any one, or to all of these offices. Only as Supreme Visible Head of the Universal Church is he infallible, and in no other capacity.

Let us then take this Supreme Head of the Church, divest him of his individuality, his personal and private qualifications, talents or attainments, strip him of all other prerogatives, offices and ranks; for merely as Supreme Head can we consider him in connection with infallibility. As such, then, what are his offices: They are four in number. Firstly, as Vicar of Christ, he has the office of Teacher and Guardian of the Christian Revelation; secondly, the office of Legislator in Ecclesiastical matters; thirdly, the office of Judge in Ecclesiastical causes; and fourthly, the office of Governor and Ruler of God's spiritual kingdom on earth. In each of those capacities is the Pope the Supreme Head of the Church, and in each has he full authority over the Church throughout the whole world. But he is *not infallible* in the four capacities, four offices, or four phases of his supremacy. He is only infallible in the first one—as Teacher and Guardian of Revelation. He is *not infallible* as Supreme Legislator, nor as Supreme Judge, nor as Supreme Ruler. It was only to the *teaching* office that infallibility was promised; and to that office is it specially restricted by the Vatican Council. Therefore, any act of the Pope as an individual, as a priest, as a bishop, as an archbishop, as a primate, as a patriarch, as a cardinal—or even as a man—does not affect the Papal Infallibility. No more does any act of the Pope as Supreme Legislator, Judge or Executive, have any force against the dogma of infallibility. Infallibility only affects the Supreme Head in as much as he is the official and divinely appointed teacher and guardian of Revelation.

Thus we find that as far as the Pope is concerned, the capacity in which he is infallible is very limited compared to what the critics of the dogma suppose. It is not such a terrible nor such a mysterious doctrine. It is logical and rational in the widest acceptance of these terms. He is only infallible in one very special capacity. In future articles we will point out that even in that capacity his infallibility is restricted to certain well defined matters; and in the case of any of these matters, it is again restricted by certain very stringent conditions. So that all the wild and fanciful ideas of infallibility are totally at variance with the truth. Moreover, there is nothing extraordinary in the fact of this "standing by," or perpetual presence of the Holy Spirit. Christ told His Vicar to go forth and teach His doctrines; He promised to send him the Holy Spirit to abide with His Church. How, then, could we suppose a Supreme Teacher of Revelation, who teaches under the eye and guidance of the Holy Ghost, to be otherwise than infallibly exact in all he teaches? To suppose such an absurdity would necessitate one of two things; either that Christ did not make such a promise, or else that the Holy Spirit did not come and did not abide with the Church—which would

mean that Christ did not keep his promise. Either of these contentions would be unworthy of any Christian.

In our next issue we will examine into what matters are subject to being infallibly taught by the Pope. We trust that our chain of argument so far is sufficiently complete. We repeat, however, for the benefit of all who have not read our last four issues. The Pope, as such, is *not* impeccable; he is *not* inspired; he is *not* gifted with the power of miracles; he is *not* above the Divine Law; he is *not* able to change a dogma of the faith; he is *not* infallible, or free from error as a man, as a priest, as a bishop, or in any capacity, save that of Vicar of Christ; he is *not*, as Vicar of Christ, infallible when legislating, judging, or executing the law of the Church; he is *only* infallible as Vicar of Christ when teaching certain things, under certain conditions. Of these we will speak more fully next week.

OPPOSITE AND EXTREME.

There are three great "Theological" virtues: Faith, Hope and Charity. Of these the ordinary Catholic knows much, and of the corresponding vices he hears and reads a good deal. But there are four other virtues that are called "Cardinal" virtues, which are received in Confirmation, and known as Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance. It is concerning these last mentioned virtues we desire to write this week.

As a rule, all Catholics know that these virtues are necessary to salvation; or rather that the corresponding vices are certain guides to eternal misery. But very many imagine that the only enemy of a virtue is its opposite vice. This is a great mistake, and it is the mother of many evils. By carrying these virtues to extremes a person destroys them just as effectively as by practising their opposites. We were led to the consideration of this subject by the somewhat self-exalting remarks of one or two friends who claim to be virtuous (according to their own testimony) in the very highest sense.

Prudence is the virtue that governs the intellect, Justice governs the will, Fortitude governs the passions, and Temperance governs the appetites. While it is not rare to find all four of these exemplified in human lives, still it is rarer than we imagine to find them perfect. Each of these virtues has two enemies, and when the one does not appear the other often steps in. The two enemies of a virtue are its *opposite* and its *extreme*. While a person may not be a slave to the opposite he may, by dint of self-reliance and temerity, become the victim of the extreme.

Some of our readers may think that we exaggerate. Let us see! The *opposite* of Prudence is Imprudence, while the *extreme* is Cunning; the opposite of Justice is Injustice, the extreme is Rigour; the opposite of Fortitude is Cowardice, the extreme is Audacity; the opposite of Temperance is Intemperance, the extreme is Insensibility.

We are under the impression that these virtues are more often violated through their extremes than through their opposites. Once a person goes into the opposite vice he is positive that he is in sin and that he has violated the virtue in question; but thousands go into the extreme of the virtue and still imagine themselves perfect, better than the ordinary practisers of the virtue, and never for a moment reflect on the fact that they are as far from the virtue on one side as the person who has fallen into the opposite vice is separated from it on the other side.

That we may be better understood we

will illustrate our meaning by examples. Prudence is a great virtue, it is the governing of one's mind, the controlling the intellect, the preventing of its running riot. The opposite is Imprudence, or thoughtlessness, absence of reflection, recklessness, carelessness in thought, word and deed. The one who is prudent is always safe and sees everything in its true light; the one who is imprudent is constantly exposed to errors, is ceaselessly in danger, and is certain to trip up and fall. But Cunning, which is the extreme of prudence, is equally as destructive of the virtue. The cunning person imagines that he is practising the virtue of prudence while actually he is allowing his intellect to become diseased with the evils of suspicion, jealousy, and other like mental or spiritual maladies.

Take the virtue of Temperance. In the true acceptance of the term this virtue applies to eating as well as drinking, to all indulgences of the appetites—no matter what the form such indulgence may take. But generally, owing to the almost universal prevalence of the liquor evil, the word Temperance has come to be almost universally applied to abstinence from strong drink. Taking it in that sense, we find that the people who sin against Temperance do so through its opposite—Intemperance. The one addicted to strong liquor is considered intemperate, and sins against the virtue of temperance. This requires no further explanation. But there are thousands in the world who are not and never have been intemperate, and for that reason they consider themselves temperate people. They imagine that they never sin against temperance because they are never guilty of the opposite vice—intemperance. The more just they believe themselves, like the Pharisee in the temple, the greater danger do they run of violating the virtue by practising its extreme.

If intemperance degrades a man, none the less does insensibility lower him. Intemperance brings a person to the level of the brute creation; but insensibility reduces that person still lower than the brute level. It destroys all merit by killing every appetite. The virtue of governing one's appetites only exists in as much as those appetites exist. The man who is insensible to the cravings of an appetite has no merit in not giving way to it, he exercises no virtue in refraining from that which does not attract him, he has no triumph in conquering that which is dead or which does not exist. While this applies to all the appetites we refer particularly to that of drink, since it is the most universal and most easily understood. The man who never had that appetite—either acquired by indulgence or inherited through birth—has very little merit in being temperate,—but he has great demerit in going into the extreme of the virtue. His merit in practising the virtue of temperance is not due to his never indulging in the opposite of the virtue—he has no temptation to drag him in that direction, and having no temptation it is an easy matter to remain virtuous. But his merit does consist in remaining temperate and refraining from falling into the extreme—that is to say, insensibility. Many life-long temperance men imagine that they practise the virtue, in all its perfection, simply because they never were guilty of its opposite. For them the virtue consists in not falling into its extreme; from its opposite they have no temptation, from its extreme they have. Where there is no struggle there is no merit; so that their struggle being with the *extreme*, their merit lies in that direction.

It is otherwise with the one whose appetite, from one cause or another, had