

the basic criterion, and to reject the promotion of Canadian exports as an important objective of aid policy. They were unanimous in opposing the use of aid as a means to wage the Cold War.

The military establishment provided the sharpest contrast. It was the least likely to perceive altruism in Canada's aid policy, or to believe that it should be an important element. The military were the least likely to locate the source of global instability in the Third World, or to agree that peace depends upon closing the rich-poor gap. They were the only sub-élite in which a plurality agreed that an important aid objective should be the containment of Communism, and were the most unanimous in support of stability in the recipient countries. They offered no support for national liberation as a purpose of Canadian assistance, and were the least likely to favour restrictions on Canada's relations with countries that make race discrimination official policy. In view of these responses, it would be difficult to read much altruism in the military's enthusiasm for Canada's role as a peace-keeper. Indeed, it seems possible that their coolness towards the aspirations of the Third World stems from a fear that generosity would be at the expense of the defence budget.

The senior officials in the Department of External Affairs emerge as the bureaucrats most concerned about internal Canadian politics. They were three times as likely as Industry, Trade and Commerce officials to agree that an important objective of Canadian aid should be the promotion of cohesion within Canada, and twice as likely to support using it to strengthen ties with La Francophonie; presumably External Affairs officials were more likely to be knowledgeable about the skillful way Canadian economic assistance had been employed to undercut the campaign to upgrade the position of Quebec in francophone West Africa, and to appease the critics who used to argue that Canadian foreign policy ignored the "French fact". This concern with cohesion within Canada should not surprise those who recall that several Prime Ministers have contended that the first aim of Canadian foreign policy must be the preservation of Canadian unity. It is less easy to explain why External Affairs should give least support to proposals to eliminate tariffs on Third World exports, and be second only to IT&C in its willingness to exploit the aid program to promote Canadian exports. In conversation, External Affairs officials are generally sceptical about the leverage to be gained over the policies of

aid-recipients, but as a group they are the most likely to endorse the use of aid to augment Canada's influence. They show considerable sensitivity to Third World feelings about maintaining relations with countries that make race discrimination official government policy. In general, however, External Affairs officials are content to leave to CIDA the advocacy of Third World interests in the Canadian policy-making process. Their complacency is also reflected in the fact that they were much the most likely to agree with the optimistic prediction that by the year 2000 the distribution of the world's wealth would be more equitable.

This facile optimism was rejected most emphatically by the 19 young External recruits we interviewed; only 24 per cent agreed with the majority of their seniors, while 38 per cent withheld any opinion. They were also decidedly more willing to meet Third World demands. Ninety per cent agreed that Canadian aid should be doubled, compared to 53 per cent of the External élite, and a third favoured the speedy removal of tariffs on LDC exports, compared to 18 per cent of their seniors. Dare one hope that the recruits will soon be influencing policy? Or is it more likely that they will be conditioned to adopt the complacency now characteristic of the department?

Industry, Trade and Commerce officials were the most prone to perceive Canadian aid as being essentially altruistic in purpose. To judge by their responses, however, this altruism is a fault to be remedied. Three-quarters agreed that an important aid objective should be the promotion of Canadian exports, and less than one-fifth favoured the speedy removal of tariffs on Third World imports. Though generally less insensitive to the LDCs than the military, IT&C officials appeared to be the least warm towards the Commonwealth and the United Nations, and exceptionally unlikely to welcome the intrusion of moral considerations, such as human rights, in the conduct of Canada's foreign relations.

#### Ministers

We interviewed 11 serving ministers, and ten who had been in earlier Trudeau Cabinets. Their perceptions of the Third World were generally similar to the bureaucrats', but they were considerably more willing to accommodate Third World aspirations. The Cabinet-level respondents, for example, were likelier to support an increase in aid and the speedy removal of tariffs. They were also more disposed to limit relations with states

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