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DEA/50052-A-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*
*Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3722

Washington, December 8, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our Tel 3706 Dec 6.†

Repeat for Information: London, NATO Paris, Paris, Candel New York, Permis New York, Laosdel Geneva (Priority), Delhi (Priority) from Ottawa, Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.

SOUTH VIETNAM – USA MEASURES; RELEASE OF USA WHITE PAPER⁴⁷

At 4:30 yesterday afternoon December 7, Assistant Secretary Harriman gave me copies of the State Department White Paper and indicated the general lines of the statement that Secretary Rusk would make at his press conference 10:30am today, December 8 introducing the paper to the public. He gave us to understand the press had already received copies under embargo against publication until December 8. The draft of Rusk's statement contained simply a reiteration of basic outline of the problem of Communist subversion in South Vietnam and referred to the Commission along the following lines: "The Government of the Republic of Vietnam has done what it could to make the situation (regarding subversion and similar activities) known. Vietnamese officials had often spoken out about the situation. It (the government) has reported in detail to the ICC in Saigon." Jorden, formerly of the *New York Times*, who compiled the paper was with us throughout our ensuing interview.

2. Harriman went on to say that Rusk had been briefed to make the following answers to potential questions:

(a) As to the state of agreement between USA and GRVN about increased assistance, Rusk would say that USA had "acceded" to the GRVN request for increased assistance in combating the Viet Cong. This increased assistance would terminate when the DRVN ceased its aggression.

(b) As to questions whether the levels of the Ceasefire Agreement would be exceeded by the increased USA aid, Rusk would, in effect, deflect such questions by referring to Communist violations of the Ceasefire Agreement as the central problem requiring attention. In this connection he would mention his hope that the ICC might find it possible to increase its patrols and continue investigation in response to the October 27 request of the GRVN (i.e. the October 24 letter, together with additional information provided on October 27).

3. Harriman said that USA position of remaining noncommittal about whether increased USA aid would exceed levels of the Ceasefire Agreement had not repeat not been taken without some difficulty: there were some in the State Department who had argued that USA should not repeat not dissimulate. Harriman made it clear that this was now a firm policy and (later in our conversations) that further deliveries of aircraft etc. to Vietnam would not repeat not be notified to the Commission.

⁴⁷ William J. Jorden, *A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam* (Washington: Department of State, 1961).