

He asked me specifically might they apply for the shipments previously ordered, he mentioned himself, totalling in all about 70,000 tons of grain, and a smaller amount of wood. I said: certainly. As respects anything else, we would have to consider any further application in the light of situations as they might develop. I said I hoped he would express to the government my regret that there had been any misunderstanding of our position. I then said I had been thinking over our talk together about the general situation. That I hoped he fully understood that while I felt the U.S. was anxious to keep out of war, I also believed that nothing would as quickly bring the States into the war as any attack by Japan on Britain. That the U.S. would immediately recognize this as part of the Axis attack on the democracies. That while U.S. sentiment might be divided as to active participation in war on the Atlantic, once war started on the Pacific, the story would, I was perfectly sure, be different. Yoshizawa said that he was inclined to agree with that. He would say that if the U.S. went to war against Britain [*sic*—Germany?], Japan would then feel it necessary to go in support of her obligations as an Axis partner. I said evidently they are each trying to do the same sort of thing, namely, to avoid the war from spreading.

I added that he must not mistake the aid which the U.S. was giving for anything other than defence of America itself, American ideals, etc. It was not an effort to gain any additional power over other countries. The Minister was quite profuse in his thanks to me for having personally called on him, and for his now being in a position to communicate to his own government, in a positive manner, along the definite lines of the interview we had just had.

He had evidently not understood from the previous interview the decision had been made by the government before discussing the matter with the B.C. members; that the idea of consultation with them was rather to see what was possible. I was careful to make the exact position carefully clear.

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*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 71

Ottawa, May 3, 1941

SECRET. With reference to your telegrams of April 19th and April 25th, Nos. 63 and D.237 respectively, and in continuation of my telegram of April 11th, No. 58,<sup>1</sup> we have been giving further consideration to your suggestions relating to possible counter action in the economic sphere as a reply to any further aggression by Japan.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.