

hind our lines, show kindness to seamen intercepted by our U-boats, and so on, we might assuage their bitter feeling. Regarding England and France, on the other hand, we should show no weakness, only strength. France has, to be sure, tied up enormous sums in Russia which might induce her to continue the war even beyond the line of our Western peace terms. Yet the right kind of propaganda might inspire the masses to refuse to fight for a people who had seemingly betrayed them. To stop bleeding by the mere acceptance of our offer! What a temptation for France!

If France showed a desire to withdraw on this basis the war spirit in the United States would suffer a serious relapse, for it is upon France that the superstructure of sentiment has been reared. The backfire from this relapse would make British politics seethe. Both in France and America we could inflame the reply to every get-on-with-the-war utterance in England that England wished to continue the war from purely selfish methods of conquest. This would not be true, but it would probably serve our purpose to the extent that an anti-war cabinet would come into power—a cabinet supported in part by some of the privileged class of hereditary landed proprietors who are fearful lest the conflict be waged to a stage which will endanger their ancient rights.

The world war is so complex that it is almost impossible to forecast the linking up of any number of details. The insignificant of to-day frequently becomes the colossal of to-morrow and upsets all calculations. But in the matter of a broad line of policy it is simple to plan a course. In brief, since we cannot win offensively, we must calmly consider how long we can