

has definitely linked Great Britain with European peace. Although Locarno professes to commit Great Britain only to the preservation of the *status quo* between France and Germany, it is inconceivable that Great Britain could keep out in the event of trouble in Eastern Europe which embroiled France and Germany, and any attempt to alter boundaries there by force would almost inevitably do so. It is nonsense to pretend that Great Britain retains complete freedom of action if trouble occurs in this area. And, of course, there are the obligations to assist in keeping the peace in Europe as elsewhere which, though indefinite, certainly exist under the Covenant of the League. Because of Locarno and the League, Great Britain has no longer a free hand in European affairs; yet because of her refusal to go farther than Locarno in making her promises definite, she has relatively slight influence in preventing the reactionary policies of the successor states which seem to be leading straight to war.

Great Britain's difficulty in going farther consists in her dual rôle as at once an European country with vital European interests, and a world Power with interests no less vital abroad. This difficulty has been accentuated by the rise of the United States as a naval Power. No British policy which endangered Anglo-American relations can be to-day satisfactory. Yet the risk of falling foul of the United States through guarantees to France is certainly less than it was prior to the Kellogg Pact of 1927. By the Pact the United States has become indirectly linked with the League in its efforts to preserve peace. The Pact, of course, makes no provision for sanctions against an aggressor as does the Covenant of the League. Yet since all League members are members of the Pact, the United States, even if it did not assist, could scarcely avoid permitting action against a state which resorted to war in violation of its obligations under the Pact. The recent Manchurian issue, when the United States freely co-operated with the Council in trying to effect a peaceful settlement, denotes a new departure in American policy towards the League. There is thus much less danger of the League, or any member thereof, resorting to action against an aggressor without knowledge of the views of the United States in advance. Yet the danger of friction has not been absolutely removed, and British policy must keep it in mind.

A further difficulty arises from the constitutional position of the British Dominions. Foreign policy is no longer the sole concern of Downing Street, and four of the Dominions look upon European difficulties from a position of relative security overseas. The Dominions have never been enthusiastic about the obligations