represented by Brussels and the CFSP, and the United States. Ever since the "Gymnich" understanding of April 1974, whereby the United States was to be informed of developments in the EPC in sufficient time for the United States to react and attempt to influence them, Washington has had privileged access to the formulation of Europe's common foreign policy. Canada simply does not have the same kind of consultative access.

From the structural and strategic perspective, for Canada the problem of access to the European decision making process and of ensuing adequate consultation is crucial. Canada has sought to address this problem through a number of joint declarations and agreements. Noteworthy about these declarations and agreements is their emphasis on commercial and technological matters and their lack of detailed consultative arrangements at the official level. In this respect, how the 1990 Joint Declaration and Action Plan are implemented will be an important determinant of how effectively Canada can prosecute its interests in the Union. At the strategic level, both the 1976 Framework Agreement and the 1990 Declaration on Canada-EU Relations suffered from neglect on both sides, and it is difficult to argue that either has had a substantial effect on the substance and character of the Canada-EU relationship. This would also appear to be true of the arrangements on political dialogue agreed in 1988.

What, then, are the options for Canada?

Acceptance of the status quo: After all, the content of the CFSP has proved to be a nonproblem for Canada. A continuation of the practice of responding pragmatically to issues as they arise would appear to be adequate to the protection of Canadian interests. However, such a policy would not address, except by default, the structural and strategic implications for Canada of the CFSP. In so far as the CFSP expands in scope and effect, then the structural impediments to Canadian access will increase. On the other hand, how far Canada should be concerned will depend on the importance assigned to Europe. On a number of occasions the present government has reaffirmed the overall importance of Europe to Canada, and the 1996 agreements may be taken as earnests of this appreciation. Nonetheless, if the Framework Agreement and the Joint Declaration are not to suffer the same fate as their predecessors, then continuous political commitment and diplomatic resources will have to be devoted to the task. If Canada is serious about the strategic dimensions (political and security) of its relationship with Europe (and, by the same token, if the Europeans are serious about their strategic relationship with Canada), then efforts must be made to ensure that the relationship is salient to Canada policy and opinion makers. The IGC agenda reflects the fact that in practice the boundaries between the CFSP and the external consequences of other Union policies frequently overlap. Thus there must be doubt as to how far Canada can effectively separate the commercial dimensions of its relationship with Europe from its political and security ones.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>The key ones being the <u>Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic</u>

<u>Cooperation Between Canada and the European Communities (1976); The Declaration on EC-Canada Relations (1990); and the Joint Declaration on Canada-EU Relations</u> coupled with the Joint Canada-EU Action Plan (1996).