

## APPENDIX 1

### THE USE OF A PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY: A CASE STUDY FROM SIERRA LEONE

Author: Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl

*All rights reserved. This document should not be cited without permission of the author.*

The existing conflict in Sierra Leone is an outgrowth of the civil war that started in 1991. In March of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), believed to have been supported by Charles Taylor, then warlord and now President of Liberia, crossed over the border from Liberia and began to operate in southeastern Sierra Leone. At first, the RUF focused on attacking the miners, townspeople, and farmers in that region, for the rebels were a tool of Charles Taylor in seizing Sierra Leone's resources to pay for the Taylor's efforts in Liberia. The conflict was started in the name of the late President Sir Kairi Alexander was Foday Sankoh, an ex-army sergeant and professional photographer in his 30s.

## APPENDIX 2

### THE USE OF A PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY: A CASE STUDY FROM SIERRA LEONE

Author: Jonah Schulhofer Wohl

President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone expanded his army from 3,000 to 14,000 troops to counter the RUF actions. However, financially restricted by the IMF and the World Bank, he could not afford to pay the troops. On 29 April 1992, officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser marched to the president's office in Freetown, ostensibly to 'demand their salaries and stage a protest.' Upon their arrival, Momoh fled to Guinea, afraid that there would be a coup. With Momoh gone, Strasser, who was only twenty-six at the time, announced the overthrow of the Momoh government, 'an end to misrule and corruption.' After failed talks with Foday Sankoh, Strasser began offensives against the RUF. In March 1993, Nigeria, which had consistently backed Sierra Leonean governments, transferred two battalions from ECOMOG, the West African peacekeeping force it led in Liberia, to help the capital Freetown. The RUF's power grew increasingly important, as the Sierra Leone Army proved ineffective. In light of this, Strasser requested assistance from the Gambia Security Guards (GSG).<sup>1</sup>

*All rights reserved. This document should not be cited without permission of the author.*

Brought in during February to train the army,<sup>2</sup> GSG was ambushed soon after its arrival. Its commander, Colonel Robert McKenzie, and Captain Tawarrelli, the aide to the president, were both killed in the attack on 24 February, while in the north of the country. GSG would not take offensive actions against the RUF, sticking strictly to their contract. Yet, the training GSG provided to the army was not bearing fruit, and the army still had not had success fighting the RUF. Shortly after the ambush the 50 soldiers of GSG left Sierra Leone.<sup>3</sup>

The situation in Sierra Leone was grave when GSG departed. Up to three-quarters of government spending had gone toward fighting the RUF minister and the rebels had captured key mines, ending production that had comprised 15 percent of Sierra Leone's GNP. In total, the government had domestic revenue of \$60 million in 1993, whereas the RUF and other rebels not associated with them controlled a trade in agricultural products and diamonds estimated to have been worth \$200 million.<sup>4</sup> The human tragedy was still worse. Approximately 1.1 million Sierra Leoneans lived in refugee camps, thousands