the mission and helped foreigners to exit, effectively abandoning Rwanda. Nigeria felt option 2 was reasonable.

Thus in overview, the US, the UK and Russia opted for a reduced presence, while France and the NAM pushed for a robust presence.

Thirteen days after April 6th, SC Res 912/94 reduces UNAMIR mandate strength to 270 and Dallaire starts to evacuate troops.

22 April

500 troops withdrawn to Nairobi today and another 500 to go on the 23rd, leaving about 600 Ghanaian and Tunisians and assorted UNMOs. UNAMIR was confident that the 20,000 refugees in their control would not be subjected to additional risks.

26 April

Canadian promise of \$4m food aid plus \$1m humanitarian (CIDA budget of 4 mill for 93/4 with another 1 mill supplementary in light of the crisis.)

27 April

UNAMIR strength at 387 troops and 72 UNMOs for a total of 459. UNAMIR in Nairobi included 15 CivPol, 175 UNMOs, and some Bangladeshis who were about to be flown home. Another 40 UNMOs in other countries and they are being relocated to Nairobi.

28 April

During 24 hour period, 200,000 refugees arrived in the Ngara region of Tanzania.

200 Canadian expatriates were evacuated without deaths, but 7 Canadians killed earlier -wife and 2 children of a Rwandan minister, and 4 Rwandan Canadians.

29 April

There was increasing criticism from the OAU and NGOs about the decision to downsize UNAMIR, but privately African countries like Nigeria and Egypt voiced concerns about committing troops in the present situation. The RPF control the north and west, and were advancing southwest. RGF were withdrawing around the Kigali airport.

There was a marathon SC meeting considering inter alia a letter from the SG to the SC endorsing more forceful action both with an expanded UNAMIR and with a upgraded peace enforcement mandate. The SC elected to postpone dealing with the SG's letter for a week, and seek further recommendations from SG before taking action.

The SC however did prepare a statement. There was contention over NZ, US, and Czech insistence on a paragraph on the responsibility of RGF for massacres and an explicit reference to genocide. Nigeria and the NAM at the behest of Rwanda tried to block it. The result was compromise language proposed by the UK and Spain which assigned blame to both albeit RGF primarily, and dropped the word genocide but with language that implied the same.

Outside the SC, RPF representative Claude Desaidi denounced the SC for dropping the reference to genocide, called for the resignation of SGSR Booh Booh, praised FC Dallaire, and said that UNAMIR should have been strengthened two weeks earlier.

2 May 1994

The US Administration in reaction to congressional and public horror with the violence in Rwanda, sent out Assistant Sec. for Humanitarian Affairs Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson, initiated humanitarian assistance of about \$15 million, and pushed for an arms embargo. They hinted about possible financial and logistical support