

The dispute settlement provisions in the Bill are, so far as I know, quite unique. In applying for certification as a bargaining agent, an employee organization would be required to choose one of two dispute settlement options, one providing for recourse to binding arbitration, the other for a procedure requiring reference to a conciliation board and offering, in defined circumstances, to employees other than those deemed "necessary in the interests of the safety or security of the public", the right to strike. Each bargaining agent would be bound by the procedure of its choice and would be unable to change its option for a period of three years.

According to present indications, the arbitration process would be the one most frequently chosen. Provision is made in the Bill for an Arbitration Tribunal based on the British model. For any one dispute, the Tribunal would consist of a permanent chairman and two members drawn from panels of individuals representing in a general way the employer and employee interests. The awards of the Tribunal would be final and binding on both sides.

So much for the proposed system. A good deal more could be said but only at the risk of burying essentials in detail. Given Parliamentary approval, the Public Service will soon have a system of collective bargaining — a system with unique features but bearing a marked resemblance to that which applies in the private sector of the economy.

It is impossible to say what the ultimate effects will be. It is possible, however, to say that the initial influence has been good. I will try to explain why.

As you may remember, the Glassco Commission, in its 1962 report, advocated a greater emphasis on managerial freedom and responsibility in the Public Service and recommended sweeping changes in the processes of personnel administration. Its report was barely off the press when a perceptive critic, the same Arnold Heeney who was later to chair the Preparatory Committee, said at a meeting of the Institute of Public Administration that, if more power was to be put in the hands of Public Service managers, more power would find its way into the hands of Public Service employees. As things turned out, it was the reverse proposition that had to be upheld. For, before much could be done about implementing the Glassco recommendations, the Government had committed itself to collective bargaining. Thereafter, it was possible to argue persuasively that, since employee organizations were to be granted bargaining rights, it was necessary to get the managerial house in order.

Let me digress for just a moment to say that, in coming to grips with the concept of collective bargaining in a public service, one of the most difficult problems is to find management and, having found it, to clothe it with the authority it needs to play its part. In a public service setting, managerial authority tends to be divided between a legislature, an executive, an independent commission and a large number of operating departments. Because badly dispersed, it tends to lack