
¹⁰⁶ The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, The United Nations In Its Second Half-Century, (A project supported by Yale University and the Ford Foundation) 1995, pp. 21-23.

¹⁰⁷ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, p.66. It should be noted that this report did not endorse UN volunteers but proposed the establishment of rapid reaction force of 5,000 to 10,000 troops to be drawn from sitting members of the Security Council.

¹⁰⁸ "Report by the Working Group on a Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade," p. 7.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, Bill 4453, "United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force Act of 2000", May 15, 2000.

¹¹⁰ Aside from the Netherlands "Non-Paper" and a section of the Canadian study, see Sir Brian Urquhart, "Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability," in Cox and Legault, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities, pp. 30-35. Also see, Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "A New Perspective on Peacekeeping: Lessons from Bosnia and Elsewhere", Global Governance, vol. 3, no. 1, Jan.-April 1997, pp. 1-15.

¹¹¹ Carl Kaysens and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force, (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, 1996).

¹¹² Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, "Design for a 15,000-person UN Legion", Project on Defense Alternatives, October 1995. available @ <http://www.comw.org/pda/unlegion.htm>

¹¹³ Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Vital Force: A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion, (Cambridge, MA, Commonwealth Institute, 1995).

¹¹⁴ For a recent variation of this argument see, Lionell Rosenblatt and Larry Thompson, "The Door Of Opportunity: Creating a Permanent Peacekeeping Force", World Policy Journal, Spring 1998, pp. 36-42.

¹¹⁵ Brian Urquhart elaborates on this point: "experience of recent UN operations shows that even a small, highly-trained group, with high morale and dedication, arriving at the scene of action immediately after a Security Council decision, would in most cases have far greater effect than a larger and less well prepared force arriving weeks or even months later. The failure to come to grips with a situation before it gets completely out of hand usually necessitates a far larger, more expensive and less effective operation later on." See Urquhart, "Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability," in Cox and Legault, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities, pp. 3-35.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 196. For further detailed analysis of similar projected expenses see, Jean Krasno, "A United Nation's Rapid Deployment Permanent Force: Cost Analysis", (paper prepared for the Yale University United Nations Study Program, 1994).

¹¹⁷ For a thoughtful example of recent work that encourages building on current UNSAS arrangements with article 43 agreements, leading to a UN Volunteer Force see, Patrick A. McCarthy, "Towards an Independent United Nations Peacekeeping Capability". For an earlier attempt at outlining this stage-by-stage process, see Langille, Faille, Hughes, and Hammond, "A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options".

¹¹⁸ Stephen P. Kinloch, "Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military Volunteer Force", International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996, p.185.

¹¹⁹ William R Frye, A United Nations Peace Force, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), pp. 106-107.